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ABSTRACT
The author examined citizen participation in four urban
renewal neighborhoods in The Hague, the Dutch seat of gov-
ernment. Research was conducted in The Netherlands between
October 1979 and January 1980. Methods of research included
personal interviews, neighborhood visits, and a review of
Dutch and English literature.
Definitions are derived for citizen action and citizen
participation. A scheme is set up to assess the effective-
ness of citizen participation by means of five criteria:
diffusion of conflict, recognition of the residents' goals
for renewal of their neighborhood, strengthening of the
organizational structure of the community, democratization
of community institutions, and community-wide learning. The
five cases are analyzed in light of these criteria.
In the cases studied, three conditions antecedent to the
beginning of participation were critical influences on the
effectiveness of the participation efforts: attitudes of city
officials (and planners) and neighborhood activists toward
one another; the level and nature of conflict before and
during participation; and the presence, strength, and opin-
ions of neighborhood leaders. Participatory techniques were
a secondary (but consequential) influence on effectiveness.
Recommendations are derived for American officials,
planners, and activists regarding ways of increasing partici-
patory effectiveness in the United States.
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INT RODUCT ION
SELECTING A SITE FOR RESEARCH
This study involves an analysis of five participatory
experiences in The Hague, the Dutch seat of government.
Before I analyze the events in each neighborhood, I would
like to explain why I chose The Netherlands as my country of
research, and The Hague as my focus.
I wanted to select a nation with a rich history of
citizen participation, and with a demonstrated commitment to
the idea that citizens should be involved in deciding issues
that affect them. Under a grant from the German Marshall
Fund, my research was to provide recommendations for planners,
politicians, and citizen activists in the United States; I
was therefore concerned about comparability. Although no
culture in Europe is truly similar to our own, I tried to
locate a country whose history and procedures of urban re-
newal are at least roughly comparable to those in America.
At the same time, I hoped to study a nation which had tested
participatory procedures that were different from those in
use in America, and which might therefore be instructive.
Finally, I wanted to choose a country where I would be able
to circulate freely among citizens and officials, and where
language obstacles would not be too serious.
There is no doubt that Dutch and American cultures and
political institutions are very different. However, in the
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field of urban renewal, there have been many important
similarities -- both procedural and historical. Planning
in both countries is conducted essentially at the local
level by bureaucrats and members of popularly-elected city
councils. Physical plans are broadly influenced by policies
adopted at the state (provincial) and national levels;
regional and national authorities oversee (and in many cases,
must approve) planning decisions made by municipalities.
Finally, most of the money which finances urban renewal
stems from the central government and private developers
(both profit and non-profit).
Even more importantly, the history of urban renewal
in both countries is very similar. In both the U.S. and
Holland, early renewal plans called for the construction
of high-rise office buildings, luxury apartment houses, and
major highways. Significant displacement of.residents was
proposed, and actually occurred in many cities. Post-
renewal rents usually proved too high for the original
residents of the neighborhoods involved. Citizen groups
organized to protest renewal plans, and eventually to
participate in the revision of those plans. Most municipal
governments have generally accepted citizen participation
as an unavoidable political reality, but effective parti-
cipation is still elusive. Difficulties have arisen in
getting "average" citizens to become seriously involved,
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and to sustain their involvement over time. Finally, many
(if not most) major plans are still made without significant
citizen participation.
However, despite these similarities, Dutch and American
societies have responded quite differently to calls for
citizen participation in terms of both philosophy and metho-
dology. Some of these different responses will be explored
in this case, and others have been examined by John Zeisel
and David Godschalk in their portion of our report for
the German Marshall Fund. My hope is that these differing
approaches to similar problems will be instructive to
Americans and Dutchmen who review our analyses.
As a last point, The Netherlands met several of my
pragmatic concerns as well. Most Dutchmen can speak English
fluently, and I am also able to speak some Dutch. Government
records and officials are generally available to foreign
guests, and I never found myself lacking for contacts among
citizen groups and activists.
My choice of The Hague similarly reflected academic
and pragmatic concerns. The case of Schilderswijk was one
of the most critical occurrences in the history of modern
Dutch renewal; the capacity of citizen groups in this neigh-
borhood to substantively alter government plans on two
separate occasions had reverberations in every major city
in Holland.
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At the same time, The Hague offered examples of more
limited successes in citizen participation, as well as
failures. The Hague (like most other large Dutch cities)
has adopted a general system for citizen participation,
but it was not as sweeping a reform as in Amsterdam,
Rotterdam, or Groningen. On the whole, The Hague is a
conservative city with a generally docile population -- a
bit less spectacular than some Dutch cities, but perhaps
more typical -- and that is precisely why I chose to study
it.
During my four months in The Hague, I studied five
participatory experiments in four neighborhoods. The
period I studied covered about ten years, from 1970 to
the present, although only my study of Schilderswijk covered
activity during this entire period.
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CHAPTER I
AN INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH SOCIETY
Understanding the cases to be presented requires some
background knowledge of Dutch society. Naturally, it is
impossible to thoroughly analyze a very complex social
system in one brief chapter. However, I will try to high-
light basic political and cultural facts which have particu-
lar bearing on the case studies, and on the implications
which will be drawn from them.
I will begin by explaining the rudiments of Dutch
politics and social traditions, followed by a discussion of
two fundamental aspects of Dutch culture: the accommodation
of differences between social blocs, and deference to
authority. I will then explain the role which planning plays
in the political process. The final section of this chapter
will discuss recent stresses in Dutch social fabric, and the
rising demand for political participation and democratiza-
tion.
Political and Social Organization
The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy governed
by a parlimentary system. The royal House of Orange is quite
popular, and a new Queen ascended the throne in April 1980.
The House of Orange, which dates back to the liberation of
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Holland from Napoleonic domination, is one of the country's
major national symbols, serving to unify diverse groups.
"There is wide consensus among both religious and secular
groups, and among nearly all political parties in favour of
the retention of royalty."1
Under the constitution, the sovereign is inviolable
(which is the Dutch way of saying that she cannot be respon-
sible for official acts of state); the Ministers are account-
able to Parliament. The "States-General" holds legislative
power in its two houses: a First Chamber (consisting of
seventy-five members appointed indirectly by the Provincial
Councils), and a Second Chamber (consisting of 150 members
elected by the Dutch people and representing various politi-
cal parties). True power resides essentially in the Second
Chamber.
Members of the Second Chamber are elected nationwide;
there are no electoral districts. All Dutchmen over eighteen
may vote for slates of candidates representing the different
parties. As a result, the number of party members in the
Second Chamber accurately represents the percentage of the
vote received by that party in the last election, which is
not the case in Britain and many other parliamentary nations.
Since the major parties represent the four "pillars" of
Dutch society (Catholic, Dutch Reformed, Re-Reformed, and
secular), this system of filling seats in the Second Chamber
enables each group to be represented roughly in accordance
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with its population in the country -- to the degree that
voters stick by the party of the group to which they belong.
(The pillar system (verzuiling) will be discussed in more
detail later in this chapter.)
The Netherlands has eleven provinces. Three western
provinces (North Holland, South Holland, and Utrecht) form
the heart of the nation in many respects. Economic activity
is centered here, in the "ring city" (randstad), a massive
conurbation which includes Utrecht, Amsterdam, The Hague,
Rotterdam and a number of smaller cities in very close
proximity. Comprising only one-quarter of the country's
land area, approximately half the population lives in the
vicinity of the randstad. The province of Zeeland lies south
of the randstad at the mouths of the Rhine River. Histori-
cally a site of major flooding, Zeeland is the location of
the Delta Project, one of Holland's major efforts to protect
its land from the sea.
Moving east, we come to the provinces of North Brabant
and Limburg, which hold the core of the country's Catholic
population. Catholics form about forty percent of the total
population of The Netherlands, but about ninety percent of
the populations of these two provinces. Here resides much
of the strength of the Catholic People's Party, the party
which has traditionally won the largest number of seats in
the Second Chamber (until the 1970's).2
As we proceed north through the provinces of Gelderland
and Overijssel, the percentage of Catholics diminishes.
The three northern provinces of Groningen, Drenthe, and
Friesland are the heartland of the Protestant parties. Only
about ten percent of the population of these three provinces
is Catholic.
The provinces are weak in the Dutch political system.
Provincial Councils are popularly elected, and each Council
appoints a Provincial Executive from among its own members
to run the day-to-day affairs of the province. Although
generally weak, the provinces do have an important planning
function, since they must approve all physical plans sent
to them by the municipalities.
Each of The Netherlands' 842 municipalities is governed
by a College of Mayor and Aldermen, which is responsible
to a Town Council. The Council is elected by the citizens
of the municipality in an at-large election; the councils
are generally divided into factions according to party
lines. Large cities, for example, are often dominated by
Labour Party councillors; whereas more conservative, southern
cities are frequently dominated by members of the Catholic
party.
The Council appoints some of its own members to be
aldermen who manage the daily affairs of the municipality.
The mayor is appointed by the "Crown", i.e. the Queen and
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her Ministers (the Queen, of course, is not actually
involved; but decisions made by her Ministers are frequently
called "Crown decisions"). The mayor chairs the College and
the Council, and serves a six-year term. He jointly
administers the municipality with the aldermen.
We will now move on to a discussion of the traditional
organization of Dutch society into four major pillars, or
verzuiling. These pillars represent the three major
religious groups of The Netherlands: the Catholics (approxi-
mately forty percent), the Dutch Reformed (a Calvinist
demonination comprising about twenty-eight percent of the
population); and the Re-Reformed (a stricter Calvinist group
of about nine percent); plus the secular (or "Humanist")
Dutch citizens who have no formal religious affiliation
(eighteen percent).3 (This leaves about five percent of
the population who belong to other religious denominations
not included in the three major religious groups.)
The division of society into these four separate
pillars pervades all aspects of Dutch social life. The
most obvious aspect, perhaps, is the existence of political
parties associated with each group. The Catholics generally
adhere to the positions and candidates of the Catholic
People's Party; the Dutch Reformed belong to the Christian
Historical Union, while the stricter Re-Reformed group
dominates the Anti-Revolutionary Party. (We should note
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here that the distinction between the Anti-Revolutionaries
and Christian Historicals is also based partly on class as
well as religion , with the Christian Historical Union
originally splitting away as an off-shoot for higher-class
members of either Calvinist group.)
The secular pillar claims two major political parties:
the Party of the Workers (Labour) for socialists, and the
Liberals for conservative thinkers (sic). This rounds out
the "Big Five" parties of Dutch politics. There are about
a dozen minor parties (many of which have sprung up in the
last fifteen years), also frequently divided according to
religious lines. (For example, the Catholic National
Party is an ultra-conservative offshoot of the Catholic
People's Party; Democrats '66 and the Farmers Party are both
secular in ideology, with the former being left-wing, while
the latter is extreme right.)
Support for the Big Five from their respective consti-
tuencies has been remarkably constant since the beginning of
the century, with the Catholics usually polling the greatest
number of seats in the Second Chamber. The close affiliation
between party and social bloc is evidenced by the fact that
four of the Big Five draw about ninety percent of their
support from one bloc; the exception is the Christian His-
torical Union, which draws about eighty percent of its sup-
port from Dutch Reformed voters.4 (This level of clear-cut
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support for the party(ies) of one's bloc has deteriorated
in recent years, as we will examine later.)
The division of Dutch society according to bloc
spreads beyond political party, however. Individual blocs
have their own newspapers, television stations, schools,
hospitals, social welfare agencies, and labor organizations;
even retail stores are often informally labelled by the bloc
membership of their owners.
In addition, personal associations are largely governed
by the bloc to which one belongs. According to a 1965 sur-
vey, about seventy-five percent of all Catholics, Dutch
Reformed, and Re-Reformed respondents stated their objections
to the marriage of their daughter to a man of a different
religion; perhaps even more strikingly, a full sixty-two
percent of people who classified themselves as secular (but
most of whom have some religious background, if only through
parental association) indicated their objection to such
marriages.5
Similar patterns can be found in friendship. Although
there is little objection to having friends in other reli-
gious blocs, intra-block friendships clearly predominate,
-
6
especially among those who attend church regularly.
Despite the deep divisions which exist among the
pillars of Dutch society, the nation is stable and passion-
ately democratic. Equality among the groups is manifest
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in many ways, not the least of which is a powerful historical
anomaly: despite centuries of prejudice toward the Catholic
minority (based largely on the association between Catholi-
cism and Spanish dominance over Holland), Catholics have
played a fundamental (and often dominant) role in Dutch
politics throughout the last century. "The paramount
position of the Catholic party is not only taken for
granted by the leaders of the other parties in the negotia-
tions preceding the formation of new cabinets, but is also
widely accepted by the rank and file of the non-Catholic
parties. "
When non-Catholic Dutchmen were asked in 1963 to state
which party or parties should form the new government, they
generally prefered the party of their bloc. In most cases,
however, their second choice was the Catholic People's Party.
Equity among the groups is manifested in many ways
throughout society. The existence of parallel institutions
(social, economic, and political) for each bloc indicates
that no group has been prevented from developing its own
"internal society" to whatever degree it sees fit. Air-time
is provided to bloc television stations in proportion to
their memberships; financial aid to church schools is
appropriated according to enrollment.
The roots of this anomalous situation of separate but
equal roles can be found in a complex system of accommodation
which developed during the early years of this century.
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Accommodation and Deference
During the early part of the century, three critically
divisive issues dominated Dutch politics: state aid to
religious schools, extension of the franchise, and collec-
tive bargaining and labor rights. Details of the conflicts
need not be presented at this time; a fuller explanation
can be found in The Politics of Accommodation by Arend
Lijphart (see note 2, p. 53 ). The important point for our
summary is that these issues bitterly divided the four
blocs (and consequently the major parties). Ideological
and religious debates threatened to destroy the Dutch 'sta-te.
In 1913 , Prime Minister P. W. A. Cort van der Linden
attempted a solution by placing the cabinet in the role of
"honest broker". He established commissions to seek com-
promise solutions to both the education and franchise
issues (the labor issue was not at that time quite so
divisive). The commissions included representatives from
all seven political parties then in existence.
After months of deliberation, the commissions recom-
mended compromise solutions on both issues. Parliament
embraced the compromises almost without dissent. Parlia-
mentary debates on the agreements took place during 1916
and 1917, during the national emergency provoked by World
War I. However, the war was not the central factor in
forcing a settlement. Lijphart cites the following three
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factors as key to the achievement of a solution:
Three special characteristics of the pattern
deserve special emphasis: (1) the pre-eminent
role of the top leaders in recognizing the prob-
lems and in realistically finding solutions in
spite of ideological disagreements -- a process
in which the rank and file were largely ignored
even to the extent of rigging an important
election; (2) the participation of the leaders
of all blocs in the settlement; and (3) the
importance of the principle of proportionality
in the substance of the settlement -- state aid
to education on the basis of proportional
treatment of all schools and representation in
future parliaments on the basis of the propor-
tion of vote received by each party.8
This "peaceful settlement" (known as the Pacificatie
in Dutch) represented a critical political turning point
in The Netherlands, and ushered in an era where the accom-
modation of differing interests became the watchword of
the Dutch state.
Lijphart identifies seven "rules of the game" which
allowed the Dutch to continue the process of accommodation
for fifty years following 1917. These rules are:9
1) Government is very much like business; it is a
serious means toward a serious end, and not a game in which
individuals play differing interests off against one another
regardless of risks to the system as a whole.
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2) The major blocs agree to disagree about major ideo-
logical and religious questions without dragging them into
daily politics.
3) Summit diplomacy among the elites of the blocs
serves to maintain communication and achieve compromises
on important issues.
4) Proportionality governs key aspects of state life.
Jobs in the civil services, air time for television and
radio broadcasting companies, financial assistance from the
central government, and other scarce resources are all al-
located with bloc proportions in mind. This division of
resources is not coincidental, but intentional. Equitable
distribution of government jobs does not result from the
fact that equally-talented members of each bloc apply for
positions in exact proportion to their numbers in the popu-
lation. As one researcher has pointed out in a study of
the town of Sassenheim:
The total amount of money for the salaries of
the personnel is divided among them roughly in
the same way as the electorate is divided into
various political (virtually religious) factions.
Thus, for instance, if about one half of the
population is Roman Catholic, the money which
is paid to the Roman Catholic clerks at the
village-hall will amount to about one half of
the total sum. Hirings are governed by the same
rule. As there are no sudden changes in the.
-21-
political composition of the electorate, elec-
tions do not disturb the system.10
5) When an issue cannot be neutralized by proportional-
izing an allocation decision, it is often "depoliticized"
by resorting to legal or constitutional principles, or even
hazing facts and figures deliberately to preserve the peace.
6) Secrecy governs negotiations among the elites of the
four blocs. In order to prevent the need for face-saving
showdowns:
The leaders' moves in negotiations among the
blocs must be carefully insulated from the know-
ledge of the rank and file. Because an 'informa-
tion gap' is desirable, secrecy is a most impor-
tant rule. In Holland, covenants are usually,
though not always, open, but covenants openly
arrived at are rare indeed.'1
Generally, Parliament has cooperated in this "conspiracy
of silence" by limiting use of its right to public inquiry.
Academics and the press are amazingly cooperative (from
an American standpoint) in supporting this process of
secret deliberations. Reasons for this are not completely
clear. Dutch academics have never developed the muck-
raking tradition which characterizes certain disciplines
in America. In addition, we must remember the degree to
which newspapers are controlled by the blocs themselves;
editors can expect to pay a high price for indiscretion.
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7) The government has the right to govern. This atti-
tude reflects the high level of Dutch deference to authority.
The right of the government to lead the nation as it sees
fit (once elected) is manifested in the general quiescence
of Parliament regarding ministerial actions, and in the
docile way in which most citizens have accepted the dominant
planning role of the Dutch municipality.
This seventh rule of the game leads us to a discussion
of Dutch deference to authority, a key element in the Dutch
code of civility. Dutch civil behavior precludes violent
displays of emotion and rejects the indulgent pursuit of
personal goals. As Goudsblom has indicated:
This prestige function of civil conduct has
sometimes called forth resistance, especially
in socialist quarters; nevertheless, in practically
every national organization, including labour
party and labour unions, the dominant code of
behaviour is civil: Civility appears to present
a generally acceptable set of rules for the
kind of relationships that sustain a nationally
integrated social structure. 1 2
Civility and tolerance go hand-in-hand in The
Netherlands, provided that no group violates basic codes
of conduct.
Dutch society is an extremely tolerant one;
the Protestant respects the rights of the Catholic,
and Protestants, Catholics, and Humanists have
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mutual respect and tolerance for each other.
Other groups, which would be labelled deviant
in some societies - such a homosexuals - are
accorded a wide degree of tolerance. But
homosexuals in Holland, by in large, conduct
themselves with orderliness and restraint, and
indeed, form their own verzuiling. Prostitutes
and pornographers occupy similar roles, carry-
ing on their professions with dignity and
restraint. The idea of tolerance, as Goudsblom
says, is matched by the idea of orderliness.
Nonconformity is tolerated as long as it does
not interfere with the prevailing social order.
At points where the norm of orderlinenss is
violated, the tolerance of the social system
ends. 1 3
The "norm of orderliness" was preserved by middle-class
Indonesians who moved to Holland in the 1950's. It has been
similarly maintained by other ethnic groups who have found
havens in the country, such as Spanish Jews and English
Pilgrims. This norm is currently being violated by South
Moluccans (Ambonesians), Surinamers (immigrants from this
former Dutch colony in Latin America), and Mediterranean
guest workers who live in styles very different from the
Dutch majority. Significant discrimination does exist
against these groups, and integration appears unlikely --
apparently proving that the Dutch are willing to accept
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people who think differently, but not people who act dif-
ferently.
Perhaps the most critical aspect of Dutch civility
for our study is deference to authority. Lijphart de-
scribed this phenomenon as follows:
Neither the ideologically stylized pattern of
elite - mass communications nor the high degree
of elite dominance of the bloc organizations can
fully explain the persistent allegiance of the
rank and file of the blocs to their leaders.
The people must have an inherently strong ten-
dency to be obedient and allegiant - regardless
of particular circumstances. This tendency will
be referred to as deference. This term is here
used in its broadest meaning: an individual's
acceptance of his position both in the social
hierarchy and on the scale of political author-
ity, accompanied by a low level of participation
and interest in politics. For the masses this
entails respect for and submission to their
superiors. 14
Cross-cultural survey research has indicated a particu-
larly high Dutch admiration for people who are "respectful,
[and who do not] overstep their place". Dutch citizens are
not likely to act singly to redress social grievances; in
fact (like many Europeans) the individual citizen is most
likely to do nothing at all, contrary to a more activist
outlook prevalent in the United States.
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Of those Dutchmen who claim they would take action,
very few are willing to contact political leaders directly
through letters or visits, in contrast to respondents from
other countries. The idea of organizing an informal group
to seek redress is far more acceptable to Dutchmen. They
are also more likely than other nationals to work through
existing formal organizations like political parties or
labor unions.15 These attitudes indicate a high level of
deference toward leaders, skepticism about the correctness
of one's own opinions (or about one's power to induce
change) , and a willingness to approach leaders through for-
mal or informal organizations if an issue is serious enough
to demand attention.
As Lijphart notes, "The Burkean dilemma of whether an
elected official should be a representative or a delegate
is not a dilemma in Holland. Leaders lead; followers
follow.,,16
The system of accommodation may seem an unlikely
setting for the development of a movement for political
participation. The acceptance of summit diplomacy, the
conspiracy of silence, and the intensity of deference to
government leaders suggest that the Dutch system of accom-
modation is not likely to spawn demands for citizen in-
volvement. In the past this has been true. As long as
accommodation worked to the satisfaction of most citizens,
-26-
they were willing to allow bloc elites to control the
country's destiny, and the future of individual cities and
neighborhoods as well. In recent years, however, the pro-
cess of accommodation has decayed -- and with it popular
deference toward government decision-making. We will exam-
ine this situation in the final section of this chapter,
after discussing briefly the role of planning in the
political process.
Planning in the Dutch Political System
Planning in The Netherlands is deeply rooted in the
age-old need for neighbors and communities to join forces
to protect the country from the ravages of sea and storm.
Massive national projects (like the IJsselmeer Polder
Reclamation Project to drain and reclaim the Zuider Zee,
and the Delta Project to protect the islands of Zeeland)
are modern-day extensions of efforts to drain the marshes,
build dikes, and dredge canals in medieval Holland.
This traditional need to plan the physical environment
has made the Dutch people significantly more amenable than
Americans to planning as a national (and local) public
policy tool. As one observer commented:
The hard communal struggle to gain and hold
land has given [the Dutch] a common concern --
a common ground -- causing them, in the words of
-27-
the British architect William Holford, 'to sink
lesser differences and [accept] a certain disci-
pline in their environment'. If planning is . . .
the organization of shortage, then the Dutch have
been planners since the first tribes moved out of
the German forests and settled on the coastal
heath and marshes. 1 7
There are many kinds of planning in Holland: economic,
land-use, regional, and a special planning system related
to the waterstaat en waterschappen (dikes, canals, bridges,
and roads). Here, we are concerned primarily with land-
use planning as it relates to urban renewal, since that is
the planning process involved in the cases to be presented
in Chapter III.
In the United States, one could argue that modern
land-use planning developed from laws and institutions
designed to build roadways and zone economic activities.
In The Netherlands, however, current state land-use
planning powers arose from an effort to reverse bad housing
conditions in urban neighborhoods. The Housing Act of 1901
is considered the ancestor of modern Dutch planning law.1 8
The Housing Act enabled the creation of a special
Dutch institution known as the woningbouwverenigingen, or
housing association. These organizations are similar to
cooperative housing societies in the U.S., but in Holland
they are much more powerful since they construct a far
larger proportion of housing. Prior to World War II, many
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associations were controlled directly by labor organiza-
tions, wealthy philanthropists, or one of the churches; of
course, each pillar of Dutch society boasted its own
housing associations.
If the association was controlled by working-class
members, they paid dues over the years and eventually re-
ceived a new housing unit from the association. If the
association was philanthropic, most of the funding was
provided by wealthy benefactors.
Since World War II, however, most of that has changed,
as housing associations became a tool for post-war redevel-
opment. Although government had always supplied some fi-
nancial support to the associations, they are now almost
totally government-funded and do most of their work for
municipalities. Most are now large, bureaucratic organiza-
tions in which members and the church play only minor roles.
Although they are technically non-profit, critics charge
that the woningbouwverenigingen are more interested in
creating corporate financial empires (based not only on
thousands of rental units which they lease and manage, but
also on investments in dozens of other fields) , than in
serving the interests of low- and moderate-income citizens.
Having digressed on this discussion of housing associa-
tions, let us now return to our history of Dutch planning
law. The Housing Act of 1901 enabled municipal governments
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to reserve land specifically for the laying of dikes,
squares, and canals. In 1921, these three categories
were dropped in favor of more general land-use planning
provisions; in 1931, the possibility of regional and inter-
municipal planning was added; and the Act was fully ex-
tended to include rural areas in 1937. Regulations govern-
ing development of the regional plans and a National Plan
were laid down during the Occupation, and incorporated in
the Act in 1950. The physical planning and housing func-
tions of the Act were eventually separated when two new
bills (a Physical Planning Act, and a new Housing Act) were
enacted in 1965.
The Physical Planning Act set down procedures where-
by municipalities can draw up development plans and obtain
(where necessary) approval for these plans from provincial
and national authorities. Various subsidies are provided
to help the municipality inthe planning process. Most
municipalities have substantial town planning departments to
carry out this work; smaller towns contract out to private
planning consultants.
Dutch land-use planning revolves around a series of
plans which are completed in succession (although localities
do not always adhere strictly to the normal order) . For
example, a typical series of plans for the renewal of an
urban neighborhood would include the following:
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1) A structuurschets ("structure sketch") describing
long-term goals for the neighborhood and outlining ways in
which the municipality might achieve these goals.
2) A bestemmingsplan ("destination plan", more loosely
translated as an allocation plan) explaining the land uses
which will be permitted in various parts of the neighborhood.
A destination plan may include zoning maps, a system for
phasing the plan in, various exemptions to plan rules, de-
tails concerning the granting of building and construction
permits under the plan, and various provisions concerning
penal sanctions against violators and compensation for those
adversely affected by the plan's implementation.
National law lays out procedures for drawing up
destination plans, involving regulations for publicity,
impact assessment, approval by the Town Council and the
Provincial Executive, and appeals of planning decisions to
municipal, provincial, and national authorities.
Under Dutch planning law, Town Councils can pass a
"preparation decision" (voorbereidingsbesluit) during a
destination planning process. The preparation decision
requires municipal officials to review every development
plan submitted by a private developer (even requests for
simple building permits) to make sure they conform to the
destination plan under consideration. The preparation de-
cision is only temporary, however, and must frequently be
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renewed before a destination plan is completed. The avail-
ability of the preparation decision provides Dutch citizens
and planners with a degree of control over development which
we lack in the United States. A preparation ordinance, if
applied early enough, might prevent the glut of speculative
activity which tends to follow the announcement of renewal
intentions in American cities.
The destination plan is the centerpiece of Dutch
municipal planning efforts, but it is normally followed by
plans which detail neighborhood development even further,
such as:
3) The verkavelingstudie (or "parceling-out study")
which gives the plan spatial detail, deciding what types of
buildings are needed in certain places, and where single-
family and multi-family housing will be located.
4) The end of the planning process usually involves a
bouwplan ("building plan") which provides architectural
details for individual buildings, parks, and roads.
Three aspects of national policy encourage citizen
participation in urban renewal planning: the publicity
requirements of the Physical Planning Act of 1965, the
appeals process and subsidies for participatory efforts:
1) Publicity requirements. The Physical Planning Act
was passed before the major demands for increased citizen
involvement of the late 1960's and the 1970's; it there-
fore reflects the paternalistic attitude toward citizen impact
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which flourished in Holland at that time. For example, at
various points during the destination plan process, "The
burgomaster [i.e. the mayor] must publish the fact that the
plan has been laid open for public inspection beforehand: in
the National Gazette, in one or more (daily) newspapers
distributed in the Municipality, and in the customary manner.
If the draft indicates any land in respect of which the real-
ization of the plan is deemed necessary in the near future,
separate notice to that effect must be given to those who
appear on the cadastral registers as owners or holders of a
right in rem in respect of that land. The notice also makes
mention of the right to lodge objections. "1 9
The current government has proposed new legislation
which contains a section dealing specifically with citizen
participation in urban renewal planning. It is designed to
expand significantly the publicity requirements of the 1965
Act. Under provisions of the bill, each municipality would
be required to do the following for each bestemmingsplan it
creates:
Firstly, a city government must announce its intention
to create a destination plan prior to the start of the plann-
ing process. It must indicate the neighborhood involved, and
the reasons behind the decision to create a plan. It must
also publish an address where people can obtain further infor-
mation.
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In addition, the Town Council must pass a by-law
explaining precisely how citizens will be involved in the
planning process. The by-law must establish procedures for
negotiation between the citizens and city officials, and pro-
cedures for discussion among citizens themselves.
Finally, the municipality must publish a report after
the participation process, specifically addressing the issues
raised during the procedure.
Government officials with whom I spoke consider the
new legislation to be as supportive of participation as a
piece of legislation can be. They readily admit, however,
that a municipality which is intent on frustrating partici-
pation could do so regardless of national legislation on the
subject.
Currently, about half of the destination plans dealing
with urban renewal which are drafted in The Netherlands in-
volve no significant public participation, according to pre-
liminary results of a study by the Advisory Council for
Physical Planning of the Ministry of Housing and Physical
Planning.20 Under the new bill, municipalities would no
longer be able to create plans completely without public
participation; nor would purely reactive method of partici-
pation satisfy the requirements of the law.
If a municipality fails to abide by the provisions of
the Act, the province. (and if necessary the Crown) can inter-
cede to carry out the law's intents.
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2) The appeals process. A central part of the Dutch
accomodation process is a procedure which allows any Dutch
citizen to appeal virtually any government decision to
municipal, provincial, and Crown authorities. After pub-
lication of a destination plan, for example, anyone can
lodge a complaint with the Town Council, seeking some
amendment to the plan. There are no restrictions regard-
ing who can lodge a complaint (although complaints by
persons with no legitimate interest in the plan are not
likely to be accepted), and there are no restrcitions re-
garding the nature of the complaint (except that the com-
plaint must be germaine to the contents of the plan).
Legal counsel is not required for the complaint procedure.
Within three to six months after publication of the
plan, the Town Council passes judgment on all the com-
plaints and decides whether or not it will adopt the
plan. If the plan is adopted (vastgesteld, more liter-
ally "established"), it passes on to the Provincial
Executive, the next body which must consider the bestem-
mingsplan.
Complaints about the plan can be lodged with the
Executive up to one month after it receives the plan for
review. The Provincial Executive must approve the bestem-
mingsplan before it can be implemented. If the plan is
out of accordance with the regional plans of the province,
or if the Executive believes that one of the complaints
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against the plan is justified, it can send part (or all)
of the plan back to the municipality for amendment. If
the plan is approved (goedgekeurd) by the Executive, it
is still possible to lodge a complaint with the Crown.
The Crown is the last resort of citizen complaint
about the contents of a destination plan. The minister
responsible for the resolution of the complaints is
the Minister of Housing and Physical Planning.
However, complaints to the Crown do not go directly
to the Minister. First, they must be considered by the
Council of State (Raad van State), a body of "old wise
men" who play an important advisory role in many aspects
of Dutch central government. The Council delivers its
opinions directly to the Minister, who resolves the com-
plaint on behalf of the Crown.
In judging complaints, the Council of State needs
the advice of experts in the planning field. Thus, the
Council "borrows" some personnel from the Ministry of
Housing and Physical Planning. These personnel form a
special office known as the Advisory Bureau of the
Council of State (Bureau Adviseur Raad van State) where
they work full-time recommending how the Council of State
should judge complaints brought to the Crown against
destination plans. There is an obvious opportunity for
conflict of interest when Ministry personnel advise the
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Council of State on what recommendations it should make
to the Minister himself. In fact, this is one of several
complaints lodged against the Crown appeal process.
The bureau has seventeen staff members who review 300
to 400 files a year. There is one file for each destina-
tion plan under review; a single file may contain as many
as eighty complaints. A staff member from the bureau must
personally interview every person lodging a complaint
against a destination plan. Since it is obviously impos-
sible for seventeen people to see all complainants sep-
arately, group meetings are often arranged; this is fre-
quently suitable because many people complain about essen-
tially the same problem. However, the system is still
back-logged. It often takes well over a year to resolve
a single complaint. The bureau is trying to reduce this
time-lag by pushing for more personnel, and seeking pro-
cedural changes in the complaint process.
After the bureau completes its recommendation on
the complaint, it sends it to the Minister, who can indi-
cate his concurrence with or objection to the recommenda-
tion if he wishes to do so. The recommendation then pro-
ceeds to the Raad van State, which will usually (but not
necessarily) agree with the advice of the bureau. From
the Council of State the recommendation goes back to the
Minister, who makes the final decision for the Crown.
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However, the advice of the Council of State is
never taken lightly. Only on one occasion since the
procedure was adopted in 1965 has the Minister for Housing
and Physical Planning failed to abide by the recommendation
of the Council of State. He has complied in all other
cases.
Some people allege that the Crown appeal process
works against the interests of poor people. This argument
was raised by the Labour government of Prime Minister Joop
den Uyl before he left office in 1977. Den Uyl and some
of his advisors complained that the appeal process was used
mainly by landowners, developers, and the rich to frustrate
plans for urban renewal and to protect their personal in-
terests. They wanted to scrap the Crown appeal procedure
and replace it with more meaningful participation at the
planning stage. However, the Den Uyl government lost power
before it had a chance to implement any of these recom-
mendations.
In speaking with about half a dozen government
officials, academics, and citizen activists, I could not
find anyone who believed the former government's opinions
were well-founded. Most said that ordinary citizens were
well-served by this fairly uncomplicated way to appeal
municipal decisions to national authorities. In fact,
some suggested that the influence of money and political
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friends was greater on the municipal and provincial levels,
leaving the Crown as the only sympathetic resort for poor
people who had few friends at city hall or in the provin-
cial administration.
The Crown appeal procedure is not token in impact;
about fifty percent of the Crown appeals are granted an-
nually, and many of these assist common citizens who would
have been adversely affected by municipal plans. Since
about half of all destination plans in Holland are still
created without real citizen input, a full range of com-
plaint procedures seems absolutely necessary, even though
the process may be used on certain occasions as a road-
block to serve the interests of the powerful.
Most persons I interviewed were sympathetic to
the former government's desire to increase "front-end"
participation. They recognize that the complaints pro-
cedure, no matter how effective, is only reactive in its
character. Nonetheless, there is a general reluctance to
dispense with it.
3) Subsidies for citizen participation. There are
four major kinds of subsidies which the central government
provides to finance citizen participation in plan-making.
The first is specifically designed to help municipalities
prepare urban renewal plans; it is called "urban renewal
preparation costs" (voorbereidingskosten stadsvernieuwing).
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This subsidy provides .35 Dutch guilders (approximately
eighteen cents) per dwelling unit, plus 7,000 guilders per
hectare (about 2.5 acres) to cover such projects as
organizing exhibitions to explain the neighborhood situa-
tion, holding public hearings, dispensing information to
the population, researching the quality of existing
housing, investigating the social and economic character-
istics of the neighborhood, hiring a project coordinator
and technial staff to assist in the participation process,
projecting the probable level of post-renewal rents, and
making a report on the results of participation. In 1980,
about thirty-five million Dutch guilders (about eighteen
million dollars) will be disbursed for urban renewal prep-
aration costs through this subsidy program.21
In addition, other urban renewal subsidies directed
to municipalities may be used in part to finance partici-
pation efforts, even though this may not be the central
intent of the subsidy.
The central government also funds experiments in
citizen participation. Communities must apply for these
funds through the Ministry of Housing and Physical
Planning, which judges applications not only on the ob-
jective potential of the procedures suggested, but also
on their newness or experimental quality.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Ministry
of Culture, Recreation, and Social Work pays the salaries
of about 500 "social/cultural workers" (opbouwwerkers) who
are active in renewal projects throughout the country. In
addition, the Ministry subsidizes the operating expenses of
many organizations run by these opbouwwerkers, providing
money for supplies, news bulletins, and even political
demonstrations (generally against the local government).
In many cases, subsidies are provided to organizations run
by neighborhood residents who are not opbouwwerkers, as is
the case in the Schilderswijk neighborhood which we will
examine later.
The notion of the central government providing
money for social workers to organize demonstrations against
city administrations may seem to be an unlikely political
situation. However, it stems from the special place
social/cultural workers hold in Dutch society, and the high
value which the Dutch attach to "welfare work" (welzijn-
werk). Welzijnwerk was handled almost exlusively by the
churches prior to World War II, and church-related organi-
zations employed most opbouwwerkers. Although the
churches' role in social work has diminished considerably,
the country has maintained its respect for welzijnwerk and
its practitioners.
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As urban residents have formed action groups to
deal specifically with complaints against the municipality,
they have demanded (and usually received) subsidies to hire
opbouwwerkers and other staff, many of whom espouse radical
ideas and spend much of their time organizing political
dissent. Both central and municipal authorities have
found it politically disadvantageous to move against these
workers, fearing reprisals from the action groups (and
their voting members).
In 1979, however, the entire system of financing
social work underwent a major change. Instead of dis-
pensing subsidies from the level of the central govern-
ment directly to the organizations which hire social/
cultural workers, the Ministry is now disbursing its sub-
sidies to municipal authorities according to a mathematical
formula. In 1979, between 400 and 500 municipalities
(out of 842 in The Netherlands) received community
development subsidies. They were able to spend this
money in almost any way they please, making most social
workers (and their organizations) completely dependent
on the municipal government for their funding.
The central government places only three fairly
weak restrictions on how the municipalities can spend
their social welfare funds. The money must be disbursed
in a way which takes into account cultural and racial
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minorities. The rights of women must also be given special
consideration. Finally, neighborhoods in need of urban
renewal must be given priority in the expenditure of funds.
Municipalities must also go through a planning process to
determine how the money will be allocated; citizens must
participate in this process.
If these conditions are not met, the central gov-
ernment can withhold payments; but two high-ranking
Ministry officials readily admitted they expect this
weapon to be used very rarely, if ever.22 The decentrali-
zation scheme was intentionally designed to give municipal
governments maximum flexibility in determining how the
money will be spent. The new scheme bears striking resem-
blance to our own Community Development Block Grant
Program, which seems to enjoy quite a good reputation in
The Netherlands -- at least among government officials.
Many opbouwwerkers, and the organizations they
serve, are openly hostile to the decentralization scheme.
Although workers for the more established and "respect-
able" social service agencies claim their finances are
safe, the employees of smaller and more dissident action
groups fear municipal authorities will cut off funding
from any groups which "make too much noise". They would
much rather receive their money from distant bureaucrats
in The Hague than from the aldermen and planners they are
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regularly fighting in their own cities. An even greater
worry is that neighborhood groups will begin to fight
among themselves as welfare funds grow more and more
scarce (the decentralization of welfare funding is ex-
pected to be accompanied by a general decline in the
total amount of money allocated to community development.)
Secularization, Protest, and Urban Renewal:
The Growing Demand for Citizen Participation
Now that we have explored some of the underlying
attributes of Dutch culture and politics, it is possible
to say a few words about the growth in the demand for
public participation. It was not the purpose of my re-
search to determine the roots of this demand, so I am
hesitant to claim the discovery of causal links.
However, my research in Holland led me to believe
that three trends in recent Dutch history may help
explain why citizens are demanding greater involvement
in government at this time. The trends are: a) the
increasing secularization of Dutch society, b) the legit-
imization of protest as a political tool in Dutch poli-
tics, and c) insensitive urban renewal planning. We will
discuss each factor separately.
1) Increasing secularization. The powerful position
of the churches as pillars of society depended heavily
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upon popular devotion to religion and deference to reli-
gious leaders. This preserved not only bloc segregation
but also public acceptance of the role of religious
elites in shaping national policies. During the 1960's,
however, the Dutch willingness to be led by religious
elites declined as part of a general retreat from religion.
A few statistics indicate the significant decline
in religious ties which occurred in the short period be-
tween 1966 and 1970:
TABLE I: VIEWS ON RELATIONS BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND
23
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS - (percent of "yes" answers)
Question 1966 1970 1975
1. Would you prefer to send your 76.1 60.4 61.0
child to a denominational school
for primary education?
2. Should politics and religion 48.6 55.5 52.9
be kept separate?
3. Should broadcasting be organized 52.4 33.8 39.8
on a denominational basis?
4. Should trade-unions be organized 40.6 27.1 30.6
on a denominational basis?
5. Are denominational political 44.8 38.4 34.9
parties necessary?
These statistics indicate that approval for sev-
eral key manifestations of verzuiling declined.substan-
tially in the late 1960's, and leveled off during the next
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five years. At the same time, neutral newspapers and
television channels enjoyed increased popularity. On the
political front, support for the Big Five parties
waned in favor of numerous new splinter parties; and of
the Big Five, the three religious parties suffered
the greatest losses -- even among regularly church-going
members, as Table II indicates:
TABLE II: RELIGION AND SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS PARTIES
(percent of respondents voting for party) 2 4
Percentage of: 1956 1967 1971 1972
Catholics (reaular) 95 77 70 53
for Catholic party
Catholics (irregular)
for Catholic party
Dutch Reformed (regular)
for Chr. Hist. Union
Dutch Reformed (irregular)
for Chr. Hist. Union
Re-Reformed (regular)
for Anti-Rev. Party
Re-Reformed (irregular)
for Anti-Rev. Party
50 37 25 25
45 54 50 44
19 14 11 8
90 88 67 61
62 58 40 36
These forces indicate a decay in the strength of
the verzuiling system in The Netherlands, and the gradual
shift of Dutch public support to secular media, parties,
and other institutions such as schools and unions. Not
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only are the people less willing to have religious leaders
negotiate key issues in Dutch politics, but the willingness
of these leaders to accept a system of accommodation has
lessened under the strain of the forces described above.
For one thing, as religious issues became less impor-
tant in national life, secular issues have caused deep
rifts within the blocs themselves -- especially with the
weakening of religion as a binding factor. The major
Calvinist parties have lost votes to conservative splinter
groups on the right at the same time they were losing sup-
port to the Labour party on the left. Social issues
related to religious doctrines (such as abortion, contra-
ception, and marriage laws) have caused serious splits in
the Catholic bloc, not only between the generally liberal
Dutch Church and Rome, but also between liberal and con-
servative Dutch bishops and their followers. While the
Catholic bloc has seemed generally willing to become part
of a more integrated Dutch social system (with a reduced
emphasis on separate institutions), the Calvinists have
remained aloof on key fronts (such as the merging of
Catholic, Socialist, and Calvinist labor organizations,
and the long-term refusal of the Calvinist Free University
to secularize its faculty).
In at least one instance, however, the Calvinist
leaders agreed to bridge the gap between themselves and
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their Catholic countrymen. In the 1977 elections, the
three major religious parties joined to form a new coali-
tion: the Christian Democratic Association (CDA), whose
primary purpose was to combat the growing power of the
Labour party. The coalescing of the three major religious
parties into one united front is a fascinating, if counter-
intuitive, result of the declining place of religion in
Dutch society, especially since the coalition succeeded in
forming a cabinet after the 1977 election.
It would be a mistake, however, to interpret this
development as a sign of old accommodation politics at
work. We must remember that the accommodation system
insisted upon strict separation of all four blocs.
Instead, the creation of CDA should be viewed as a sharp-
ening of tensions between the centrist forces of the
religious parties and the socialist Labourites (and, to
a lesser extent, the Liberals).
Even before the creation of CDA, the Labor party
ceased to support the system of accommodation. Under
pressure from the left-wing of its own membership, and new
splinter groups like Democrats '66, the Labour party began
reemphasizing traditional socialist demands. It has vir-
tually ruled out the possibility of a cabinet coalition
with the Catholics', and has attempted in recent elections
to present voters with the kind of "clear alternative"
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that rarely occurred in the bland elections of the accom-
modation era.
Other "rules of the game" are also under attack in
the move toward a more secular society. Left-wing parties
have demanded that executive positions at the provincial
and municipal levels be filled by members of the party
winning an electoral majority, rather than proportional
representation from each bloc. In addition, members of
the Second Chamber have made increasing use of their right
to question the cabinet publicly, breaking the rules of
secrecy and summit diplomacy, and challenging the govern-
ment's right to govern.
2) Acceptance of protest as a legitimate political
activity. Dutch deference to authority has waned during
the past fifteen years. Action groups to deal with polit-
ical problems (particularly in urban areas) have prolifer-
ated,frequently led by social/cultural workers (and often
led by Marxists in the nation's larger cities).
These groups have become increasingly willing to
engage in demonstrations, acts of civil disobedience, and
violence as they found the verzuiling and electoral sys-
tems notably impregnable to their demands. The influx of
young Americans to Amsterdam in the 1960's may have con-
tributed to the increasing demands for liberalization in
laws and social mores, but the source of the movement was
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more probably indigenous -- springing from real dissatis-
faction with a process governed by religious and secular
elites.
Initially, "those who most readily involved them-
selves in . . . direct action [were] young people who have
received a higher education and who live in urban areas".
During the 1970's, however, the tendency to be involved in
such actions "spread to another population category, namely
those who are less educated, aged forty-five or under, and
live in cities" .25 This trend can be seen as evidence of
the increasing legitimacy of protest as a form of polit-
ical activity in The Netherlands.
3) Insensitive urban renewal planning. In this case,
a direct link can be drawn between the insensitivity of
government plans for urban renewal and the demand for citi-
zen participation. Urban renewal began later in The
Netherlands than in the United States. After World War
II, the Dutch government concentrated energy and money
on the construction of new housing to solve the critical
housing shortage which remained as a legacy of the occupa-
tion. Much of this new construction helped to spur the
decline of inner-city neighborhoods. It was not until
the early 1960's that the Dutch government began to pay
attention to its "blighted" central cities. The chief
mechanism for renewal, however, was demolition. In fact,
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the central government openly encouraged the destruction of
"inferior" housing by awarding municipalities a refund of
eighty percent of the cost of acquiring such properties. 2 6
In early cases, Dutch deference to authority (and
the unwillingness of the major parties to object to the
destruction of inner-city neighborhoods) muted significant
public response. We will examine such cases later in two
neighborhoods near Schilderswijk in The Hague; in these two
areas, massive displacement occurred with relatively little
opposition. Gradually, however, students, left-wing politi-
cians, opbouwerkers, and neighborhood leaders organized and
demonstrated to fight the demolitions.
Convinced that government leaders would never take
their demands seriously unless residents participated direct-
ly in the planning process, these confrontations generally
featured demands for greater citizen involvement in urban
renewal planning. Municipalities have not responded uniformly
to these demands, but many have recognized that citizen
participation is indispensible to the modern renewal process.
As one central government official told me, "It is currently
impossible for any municipality to plan without citizen
participation; the action groups would raise too great a
cry.",27
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This particular statement seems a bit too optimistic,
since many plans are still created without significant
citizen input. Nonetheless, his comment certainly applies
to The Hague and other major urban areas, where action
groups are strong and citizens' willingness to pursue their
interests through the "normal channels" of party politics
is very weak.
I would postulate that these three factors (seculariza-
tion, protest, and urban renewal) provide good reasons for
the growing demand for citizen participation. (At very least,
they are logical reasons which deserve closer study.) In the
past, institutions associated with the pillars of Dutch
society could mediate an individual's complaints about the
system. He would seek the redress of grievances through
political parties, trade unions, and other institutions
associated with his church or the secular bloc.
In recent years, however, these associations became
less helpful to Dutch citizens, partly because the religious
elites failed to provide assistance where it was desperately
needed (as in their failure to prevent massive displacement
in the inner-city), and partly because people's expectations
had increased (which helps to explain the call for major
expansions of public services in the 1960's). As a result,
people drifted toward the secular bloc, or toward splinter
groups associated with no bloc at all. Since they may well
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have felt abandoned by leaders they had previously trusted,
deference toward authority declined and protest became an
acceptable political instrument.
However, ingrained cultural traditions die hard.
Although they are no longer afraid to express their disagree-
ments strongly, the people of The Netherlands are still
deeply committed to preserving the system around them for
the sake of the "common good". Accommodation may no longer
rule the political life of the country, but it remains a
respected mode of social conduct.
This condition provides two factors which are both
critical to the growth of citizen participation as a national
movement. Recent developments provide an impetus for citi-
zens to recognize and defend their own interests vigorously;
Dutch traditions, on the other hand, provide a willingness
to sit down and reach compromises in an atmosphere of
mutual respect and trust.
This does not mean, of course, that the conditions for
citizen participation are universally excellent throughout
The Netherlands; our cases in The Hague will certainly
indicate that participation does not always wo.rk flawlessly
in Holland. Nonetheless, the country does appear to provide
a healthy climate for the growth of effective citizen
involvement in government decision-making.
In the next chapter, I will try to build a way for as-
sessing the effectiveness of particular participatory efforts.
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CHAPTER II
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
Researchers and practitioners who have written about
citizen participation usually explore techniques which can
increase or improve citizen involvement in government
decision-making. The literature on how one might evaluate
the effectiveness of citizen participation efforts (and the
specific techniques in use) is much more limited.
In a recent paper, Judy Rosener lamented:
Too few evaluations generate data on the effec-
tiveness of techniques in the context of some set of
goals and objectives. For the most part, existing
evaluations are 'after-the-fact', philosophical,
and lack support for a determination that there is
a relationship between a technique and some desired
outcome. Even in those cases where the term effec-
tiveness is used (implying that a specific technique
produces some intended effect) the criteria for
measuring effectiveness are not spelled out.1
Before we left for Europe, members of our project team
were specifically asked to address the question: what makes
citizen participation effective? In attempting to answer
this question, I will be guilty of at least two of the charges
leveled by Rosener. My evaluation will be after-the-fact
and largely philosophical. Rosener is not the only person
to criticize ex post facto evaluations; in fact, at the same
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conference, Robert Shingles noted:
The reason most research is inadequate is
because impact analysis is the study of causation
whereas most research findings depend almost
exclusively on ex post facto, correlational data.
Studies depending upon data collected at one point
in time cannot differentiate between association
and cause and effect or between effect and self
selection. In the great majority of cases (unless
one is uncommonly lucky and avoids the usual threats
to validity) only experimental designs and, to a
lesser degree, quasi-experimental designs provide
the logical and empirical rigor necessary for making
cogent causal inferences.2
Unfortunately, it is very difficult for foreign na-
tionals to induce European governments to launch controlled
experiments in social science research. The fact that some
provocative cases can be studied only ex post facto should
not, in my opinion, stop us from studying them. Nonethe-
less, I carefully avoid drawing causal links between given
techniques and outcomes when I believe that only correlation
can be safely supported by the evidence I have gathered.
In addition to being after-the-fact, my study will also
be at least somewhat philosophical in searching for implica-
tions in the data I have studied. This seems easily jus-
tifiable, since the struggle for greater citizen partici-
pation in government has involved serious conflicts between
differing value systems over such questions as: who will
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determine the future of residential neighborhoods, what are
the limits of representative democracy, and how will the
interests of the inarticulate and disadvantaged be repre-
sented in society?
Later in this chapter, I will attempt to overcome a
third charge which Rosener has leveled against the evaluators
of citizen participation; I will present a scheme of criteria
through which we can evaluate the effectiveness of citizen
participation in The Hague.
Defining Citizen Action and Citizen Participation
Before moving to the evaluation criteria which are the
main purpose of this chapter, I would like to explore pos-
sible definitions of citizen participation itself -- and
contrast it with citizen action. This step is important not
only because citizen participation is the central focus of
this study, but also because it arises from citizen action
in each case I examined in The Hague.
In the cases I studied, and in many of those examined
by other members of our project team throughout Western
Europe, citizen action and participation seemed to be ends
of a continuum (see Figure I) which described the historical
evolution of participatory processes (although it was cer-
tainly possible for the continuum to "double back on itself"
if a participatory process decayed).
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FIGURE I: CITIZEN ACTION - CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CONTINUUM
CITIZEN ACTION:
(protest, conflict,
lobbying, and other
forms of indepen-
dent efforts by
citizens and groups)
PSEUDO-PARTICIPATION:
(informational, reac-
tive, often cosmetic
forms of allegedly
involving citizens in
government decision-
making)
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION:
(real citizen influence
in shaping the public
agenda, as well as
plans, policies, and
programs)
The descriptive listings under each of the three cate-
gories are meant to provide a preliminary idea of the charac-
teristics in each step, rather than rigorous definitions.
For the time being, I would note that the continuum presented
above illuminates the following important points which we
ought to remember as we seek a more comprehensive definition
of citizen participation:
1) Since citizen participation frequently arises from
conflict and protest, there is a "gray area" where citizen
action and participation merge. Although the two are differ-
ent, we should not shy away from definitions which overlap.
-60-
2) Citizen participation does not exist in a "time-
free zone". It evolves, and can regress as well. A compre-
hensive definition of citizen participation should take note
of this development process.
Stuart Langton has noted the difference between citizen
action and citizen involvement. He argues that citizen
action "is initiated and controlled by citizens for purposes
that they determine. This category involves such activities
as lobbying, public advocacy, and protest."3
Langton's notion of citizen action as being citizen-
initiated (or "bottom-up") is particularly appropriate to
the cases I studied, where movements toward participation
always began with organizing efforts on the part of grass-
roots citizen groups. So defined, citizen action can include
not only lobbying, public advocacy, and protest, but also
neighborhood organizing, coalition-building, and the devel-
opment of alternative plans. Janice Perlman elaborates on
Langton's definition by noting:
Both [citizen action and citizen involvement]
are supposedly mechanisms to gain power through
participation. It is important to point out, how-
ever, the unfortunate paradox of our system: that
only those at the lower end of the social hierarchy
need to participate in order to generate power.
Large corporate and banking interests, for example,
have ample power without any 'participation'. They
are generally able to promote their self-interest
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successfully through the use of corporate
resources and without the sacrifice of much per-
sonal time or energy to hearings, meetings, or
demonstrations. Individual citizens, on the other
hand, are often asked to participate at consid-
erable personal sacrifice in public hearings or
on local boards, only to find themselves as power-
less as before. The citizen-action approach,
then, is based on a substitution of numbers for
monetary resources and of commitment and courage
for position and authority.4
This substitution of numbers, commitment, and courage
for money, position, and authority is critical to under-
standing the place of citizen action in the political process.
It enables us to recognize citizen action not simply as a
procedure for accomplishing political ends, but more spe-
cifically as a effort to overcome political inequality in
a hostile environment.
If we see citizen participation as an outgrowth of
citizen action (as it is in most cases), then this defini-
tion allows us to understand why government officials are
so unwilling to respond by creating participatory mecha-
nisms, and why citizen activists find it so difficult to
shift from the conflict-oriented mode of action to the
cooperation-oriented mode of participation. Citizen activ-
ists (as here defined) do not merely seek political decisions
which would serve their interests, but they do so from the
position of underdogs seeking to overcome an unfavorable
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balance of power. This definition separates citizen activ-
ists from more powerful actors in society who may also
lobby to protect their interests (such as bankers, large
landowners, and corporations).
As we now move on to defining citizen participation,
we consider Langton's definition of citizen involvement.
Langton asserts that citizen involvement (in contrast to
citizen action) "is initiated and controlled by government
to improve and/or to gain support for decisions, programs,
or services. This category involves such activities as
public hearings, consultation with advisory committees, and
attitudinal surveys."5 Langton acknowledges his belief that
involvement and citizen participation are very different,
when he writes, "[Involvement] implies that one thing is
encumbered or controlled by another. But participation
connotes variation in how things 'take part' in each other,
because the control may rest in either or may be equally
shared."6 I would not create so sharp a distinction between
involvement and participation; in fact, I use both terms
interchangeably throughout this report. However, Langton's
discussion of this issue brings forward the important point
that responsibility for participation is shared between
government and citizens.
Langton's actual definition of citizen participation,
however, is disappointing. He defines participation as
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"purposeful activities in which people take part in relation
to political units of which they are legal residents".7
This definition falls short of the mark in several respects.
It does not emphasize the importance of the cooperative aspect
of participation. It is unclear, because "to take part in
relation to political units" is highly ambiguous; it can
include open conflict (which seems too far to the left of
our continuum), and voting in elections (which would make
the definition so inclusive as to be meaningless). It also
fails to recognize citizen participation as a developmental
process which can evolve or regress.
The 1976 Report of the Social and Cultural Planning
Office of The Netherlands presents a definition which has
similar problems, although its language is a bit more pre-
cise. The report calls participation "that part of the
behaviour of the citizen that is aimed at exercising
influence, directly or indirectly, in the political sphere". 8
In light of the inadequacies of these definitions, I
would like to suggest the following explanation of the com-
ponents of citizen participation (rather than a simple
definition of what citizen participation is):
Citizen participation is a process wherein citizens
and government officials jointly plan or implement public
policies. This process contains (at least) the following
components:
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1) Both citizens and government tacitly or explicitly
agree to cooperate with each other in the formulation of
policy; although cooperation need not be complete at all
times, an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect must
dominate the process.
2) Both citizens and government have real power to
affect public policy decision-making; although one side may
have more power than the other, the power of neither side
may be trivial.
3) As a process rather than a stable state, citizen
participation may evolve or regress; an example of evolution
would be the expansion of subject areas covered by the
process, or a deepening of cooperation between government
and citizens; an example of regression would be a lessening
of cooperation and a return to conflict.
One possible criticism of this definition is that it
is too broad, because it overlaps with the definition of
citizen action which we discussed earlier. Certain forms
of lobbying, coalition-building, the development of alter-
native plans and many other aspects of citizen action are
not ruled out by the existence of a participatory process,
nor do I believe they should be. The notion of a citizen
action - citizen participation continuum necessitates some
definitional overlap.
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A second criticism (paradoxically) could be that the
definition is too specific, because it rules out forms of
alleged participation (such as information-sharing and
ex post facto opportunities for public reaction) which
characterize many government efforts to appease citizen
activists. In Figure I, such efforts were labeled "pseudo-
participation" because they only appear to be participation,
although they actually are not.9 Naturally, I can easily
visualize such attempts as part of a broader participatory
process; but they cannot stand on their own. Since this
study aims at isolating examples of effective citizen par-
ticipation, I think we should not hesitate to define the
phenomenon strictly.
At this point, we will return to the primary intent
of this chapter: to outline a series of criteria for judging
the effectiveness of citizen participation.
Evaluation Criteria
In choosing criteria, I have been influenced by
existing literature in the field of citizen participation
and by my own judgment of what the goals of participation
ought to be. In addition, I have given careful considera-
tion to the normative values of the people I studied,
that is Haagenaars themselves. I had the opportunity to
interview city workers, community organizers, neighborhood
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residents, independent planners, politicians, and academics
in the course of my research. I asked them to explain their
views on what constituted effective citizen involvement, and
to comment on whether they thought the participatory experi-
ences I was studying were examples of this. In cases where
the criteria I finally selected differed from their views,
I will so indicate.
I have isolated five major criteria for evaluating the
effectiveness of citizen participation:
1) The diffusion of conflict within the community, and/or
between the community and the municipal government. For
purposes of this report, we define conflict between resi-
dents and the municipality rather broadly, to include
active efforts on the part of residents to:
a) discredit or embarrass the government in the
public media;
b) legally maneuver to delay the implementation
of government plans;
c) publicly demonstrate (legally or illegally); and
d) commit acts of violence, including not only
violent demostrations, but also acts designed to stall the
implementation of certain plans (such as tearing up cobble-
stones or squatting in vacant buildings).
It is important to note that conflict is not only
resident-initiated; municipal officials also "wage conflict"
against residents, in forms such as:
a) efforts to deceive the public about the stage
of renewal planning, or the actual content of renewal
plans;
b) plans that aim to displace large numbers of
residents (directly through demolition, or indirectly
through severe rent hikes), without adequate compensation
or relocation assistance; and
c) attempts to discredit or embarrass neighborhood
leaders by attacking their legitimacy in the public media,
or attempting to divide resident groups or coalitions
through under-the-table deals with individual groups or
persons.
Conflict is costly both in terms of time and money.
Generally speaking, I observed that little renewal was
actually accomplished in most Dutch cities during periods
of active conflict. In addition to this practical con-
sideration, the Dutch place a very high value on the main-
tenance of stability in society, as indicated in our
discussion of civility, tolerance, and deference in Chapter
I (see pp. 22-26). Although the past twenty years have
witnessed a marked increase in the willingness of Dutch
citizens to openly oppose government authority, the over-
riding Dutch sentiment remains that conflict is an unnat-
ural state which ought to last only until a reasonable
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accomodation among parties can be reached.
A German researcher currently teaching at the
University of Amsterdam emphasized the need for a "timely"
end to conflict. If the point of cooperation comes too
soon, the action group risks co-optation of its interests,
and a renewal process which it will find unsatisfactory.
If, on the other hand, the point of cooperation comes too
late, the community will be damaged by neighborhood in-
stability and the threat of violence. Furthermore,
the city must seek cooperation at some point, since it
cannot practically expect to begin renewal independently
under the Dutch system of appeals to the Town Council,
the province, and the Crown (see pp. 34-38). Therefore,
we find both cultural and procedural roadblocks to
continued conflict in the Dutch planning system.
In the United States, conflict is sometimes
viewed as an acceptable enforcer of stalemate. Protesters
are often willing to maintain a high level of tension in
order to stymie authorities until they give up their
plans completely. This view is socially less acceptable
in Holland than it is in the U.S., although it is not
without its practitioners. The Renbaankwartier/
Scheveningen case will present an example of a residents'
group which maintained a high level of conflict even
during a participatory process, until the government
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backed down to most (.but not all) of the group's demands.
The diffusion of conflict applies not only to
conflict between the community and the municipality, but
also to conflict within the community itself. Renewal
issues are sufficiently complex and Dutch neighborhoods
are sufficiently diverse, that conflict can develop between
differing factions within individual neighborhoods over
both substantive and procedural issues.
The Schilderswijk cases will show how conflict
developed between left-wing and moderate groups largely as
a result of the way in which a participation process was
being conducted. The correlation in this situation be-
tween the participatory effort and an increase in neighbor-
hood tension is certainly disquieting.
Even more unsettling is the probability that cer-
tain agreements reached during participation may adversely
affect minority groups who were not involved (or failed to
involve themselves, depending upon your point of view) in
the negotiating process. Such oversights can lay the seeds
for future conflict within the neighborhoods involved.
Once again, Schilderswijk is a prime example of this
problem.
Finally, conflict can develop between the resi-
dents and their leaders, especially when these two groups
have differing values about the proper characteristics
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of renewal. If a participatory process fails to circum-
vent or eliminate this conflict, as in Schipperskwartier,
it is fundamentally flawed.
A final caveat is in order before we proceed to
the second criterion. Some analysts (particularly
Marxists, who form an important segment of the Dutch
social science establishment), may dispute the value of
reducing conflict at all under current conditions of
capitalist society in The Netherlands. Since I am sen-
sitive (and even sympathetic) to this outlook, I emphasize
that my use of this criterion does not mean that conflict
has no place in renewal politics. On the contrary, I
believe that most citizen participation efforts I studied
would have achieved very little success (and in fact,
would probably never have occurred) had conflict not
preceded them.
However, conflict is a resource of limited util-
ity -- particularly to action groups which are understand-
ably concerned about achieving modest improvements in
living conditions in a short space of time. Their success
in this endeavor is dependent upon their ability to influ-
ence numerous parties in power, particularly municipal
authorities (who must approve final plans) and national
ministries (which provide most of the funding). The
residents of Schilderswijk adopted a cooperative ideology
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when their ability to influence these actors by conflict
faded; the residents of Renbaankwartier failed in this
regard, and may have permanently damaged their reputa-
tions by doing so.
2) Municipal recognition of the current residents'
goals for renewal of the neighborhood, Recognition is
a two-step process of a) legitimizing those goals, and
b) implementing plans which flow therefrom.
In order to legitimize the goals of the current
residents, the municipality must agree to a series of
process-oriented reforms, assuming that residents were
heretofore essentially excluded from the planning process.
These reforms should:
a) provide residents with increased access to
official information;
b) involve residents in the plan-making process,
as well as the process of implementation; and
c) enable citizens to have a real impact on the
decision-making process (in other words, the consensus of
the community should substantially shape the future of the
neighborhood).
Reforms such as these comprise the whole range of
participatory techniques which have been the focal point
of most studies of citizen involvement in government
decision-making. Frequently, residents in conflict with
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the municipality will demand not only substantive changes
in plans for their neighborhood, but will also insist
upon participation in the plan-making process itself. In
fact, the search for these procedural changes may become
the central focus of the group's struggle.
However, the creation of a participatory process
which the neighborhood considers satisfactory does not
necessarily mean that the process will be effective. I
would argue that an effective participation process must
attain concrete results which improve the physical and/or
social qualities of the neighborhood, such as housing
improvement, greater traffic safety, more park space, re-
duced crowding, greater equality of housing opportunity,
expanded educational opportunities, and/or reduced social
tensions. Without such accomplishments (i.e. actual
accomplishments, not merely planning documents generated
by the participatory process), effective participation will
remain merely a promise to those who were involved.
Before we leave this point, two caveats are in
order. The first notes that a true neighborhood consensus
is very difficult to find. Accepting the involvement of
a particular residents' group does not automatically mean
that the city has legitimized the aspirations of the
entire community. In fact, Schipperskwartier provides us
with an example of a case where the opposite appears to
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be true: the group accepted by the city in that case seems
to represent only a portion of the neighborhood's opinions.
An even more perverse situation prevails in Molenwijk, where
many of those involved in the participation process will not
remain in the neighborhood after renewal is completed.
Secondly, acceptance of the residents' goals for the
neighborhood does not require that the municipality direct
renewal completely toward fulfillment of the residents'
desires, since these desires may conflict with the general
welfare of the municipality. However, in most cases, the
opposite appears to be true: municipal plans for low-income
neighborhoods generally ignore the welfare of the citizens
who live in these areas (often on the pretext of serving the
general interest). Citizens often demand participation in
an effort to overcome this situation.
In order for participation to be successful, gov-
ernment must recognize that residents' desires for their
own community must play a major role (perhaps the major
role) in shaping the future of that neighborhood. Nonethe-
less, a complete acceptance of the majority view (or even
community consensus) can damage not only the general public
welfare, but also the interests of minority groups within
the community itself whose views (even if vocally expressed)
may not be "loud enough" to significantly influence the out-
come of the participatory process. Since government is
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charged with protecting the interests of such persons (and
this viewpoint is very seriously held by most Dutchmen,
despite the existence of discrimination against racial/
ethnic minorities), the need to balance general neighbor-
hood desires with the interests of under-represented groups
must be carefully considered in evaluating the effectiveness
of participation.
Generally, this second caveat is at odds with the
opinion of most activists I interviewed, as well as many
planners who have "bought into" the participation process,
In a reaction to the callous way in which Dutch municipali-
ties have treated residents of low-income neighborhoods,
the advocates of citizen participation have adopted as a
rallying cry "renewal for the current residents" (stadsver-
nieuwing voor de bewoners). This position is understandable
in a political atmosphere where tremendous pressure exists
to ignore the interests of community residents entirely.
However, there are times when implementation of this philos-
ophy contradicts standards of equity which are supposed to
underlie the municipality's public policy responsibilities.
For example, the goal of attracting more young
families with few children to inner-city neighborhoods
played an important role in the municipality's plans for
Schilderswijk and Schipperskwartier. This goal may be
worthy as an effort to improve the economic and social
-75-
climate of the central city, and decrease income disparities
between the city and new expander-towns. However, this ob-
jective has been significantly compromised by the new plans
for these two neighborhoods, largely as a result of the
degree to which current residents shunned the idea of devel-
oping housing for new inhabitants.
More importantly, many cities in Holland are
increasingly concerned about providing wider housing oppor-
tunities to blacks and guest workers who have been crowded
into a handful of neighborhoods in the past. In the present
climate of "current-resident chauvinism" many resident groups
are able to scrap city plans which would result in higher
minority populations in their neighborhoods.
3) Strengthening the organizational structure of the
community. Although a "strong organizational structure" is
difficult to define, it is possible to list certain develop-
ments which will improve a community's ability to articulate
and defend its interests during current, and future,
planning. Such developments include:
a) evolution of a representative, cohesive resident
organization(s);
b) emergence of a dedicated community leadership;
c) establishment of useful contacts between resi-
dents and municipal officials; and
d) expanded resident concern for and involvement in
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planning the neighborhood's future.
Analyzing a community for evidence of a strengthened
organizational structure is a task fraught with pitfalls,
Use of the following three questions can be of help:
a) Has the entire community been strengthened, or
only one organization? In Schilderswijk, there are legiti-
mate reasons to believe that the majority of power flowed to
one particular group which did not necessarily represent
the opinions of certain segments of the population.
b) Who has been strenghtened: the community as a
whole, or the leadership cadre alone? In Schipperskwartier,
most of the power has accrued to a select group of profes-
sional organizers.
c) Has strengthening occurred in a way which will
benefit the community in the future? Much of the organiza-
tional infrastructure which has developed recently in
Molenwijk will probably decay during the next decade as
residents move out of the neighborhood.
4) Democratization of community institutions. Paradox-
ically, citizen participation -- touted as a great exponent
of modern-day democracy -- frequently imposes authoritarian
structures on the neighborhoods involved. We have seen the
dominance of charismatic leaders and militant elites in many
U.S. cities, and Dutch cities follow a similar pattern.
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Ideally, participation offers a unique opportunity
to expand the democratic institutions which exist at the
grass-roots level, as the following examples illustrate:
a) bringing into the process groups which had not
previously been active in neighborhood politics, or in the
protest which usually precedes participation; in the cases
I studied in The Hague, this would mean particularly blacks,
guest workers, women, the elderly, and children;
b) delegating powers and responsibilities within
citizen groups in such fields as group administration,
policy-making, public relations, and negotiations with the
city; and
c) developing direct lines of authority from group
members to group leaders, enabling the membership to rou-
tinely influence the participation process.
Using participation as a lever to increase neigh-
borhood democracy is near and dear to the hearts of many
Dutch intellectuals who study citizen participation, as
well as certain planners and activists. Some planners, on
the other hand, charge action groups with undemocratic
activities in order to discredit them and derail the par-
ticipation process; some politicians, especially those of
right-wing parties, are likely to do the same.
Similarly, many activists resist pressure to democ-
ratize their institutions, whether that pressure arises from
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within the neighborhood (as in the case of Schilderswijk),
or from outside the community (as may well be the case in
Schipperskwartier, if the city becomes increasingly uncom-
fortable with the questionable representativeness of
Actiegroep Vergetendorp). Activists may oppose democratiza-
tion (although rarely in public) for differing reasons.
Some are merely jealous of their own power. Others, how-
ever, sincerely believe that increasing openness will put
them at a disadvantage against their natural enemy: the
municipality. After all, if the city can function as a
bureaucracy (with bosses making decisions and subordinates
carrying them out), how can an action group be expected to
keep pace when its leaders are restricted by the need to
send recommendations through public, democratic channels
before taking action?
These complaints, although understandable, may be
exaggerated. Numerous American experiences, as well as
my review of cases in The Netherlands, seem to indicate
that significantly more democracy is both possible and
practical in urban communities. To the degree that citizen
participation in government decision-making can serve as a
catalyst for democratization, such trends should be encour-
aged. I believe, therefore, that the effectiveness of a
participatory process should be judged partly on its record
as a democratizing influence on the community involved. As
-79-
a result, I am including this criterion, although I fully
expect that many planners and activists will disagree.
5) Community-wide learning. This may well be the
most illusive of all outcomes of participatory efforts; in
fact, observers rarely agree on what community-wide learning
is. The proponents of participation cite it as one of par-
ticipation's chief benefits; opponents claim it is very
overrated. I define learning to include a series of skills
which would help people defend their interests more effec-
tively in the next round of conflict or participation.
Some of the skills which action groups and residents
could benefit from learning (and which participation can in
fact teach) are:
a) appreciating political relations within the city;
b) knowing how to engage in bargaining, negotiation,
and mediation;
c) understanding planning techniques and problems;
d) learning the economic realities of urban life,
and some ways of coping with them;
e) developing an ability to set priorities and iden-
tify goals (both personal and community-wide); and
f) learning how to work in groups, and lead groups
when necessary.
The list could go on indefinitely, since the number
of skills which individuals can learn is surely limitless.
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In addition to examining the skills learned, however, it is
equally important to ask who learned them. The importance
of particular skills varies among different types of people,
and certain groups clearly manifest greater or lesser abil-
ity to learn in the course of the participatory process.
My observations indicated that the communities broke
down into three essential groups according to the type and
amount of learning which was accomplished:
a) the leadership cadre (such as action-group
leaders and social/cultural workers);
b) the average residents of the community (the
Dutch workina class); and
c) the most disadvantaged members of the community
(such as black immigrants from Dutch colonies, guestworkers,
and the elderly).
Although these groups clearly learned at different
rates, I do not presume to compare their actual learning
abilities. Instead, we should recognize that the degree of
learning depends not only upon the talent and dedication of
the group involved, but also upon external conditions such
as past educational oppor'tunities, fluency in the Dutch
language, previous exposure to democratic institutions, and
the degree of involvement which the participatory process
affords to different classes of people.
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Before leaving this criterion, I wish to take note
of a deeper way to look at the idea of community-wide
learning, as suggested in the work of Donald Sch'n and
Chris Argyris; this is the notion of single-loop and
double-loop learning. In single-loop learning, community
leaders and residents would pick up individual lessons one
at a time (such as the skills mentioned above), while the
central theories and expectations of the community or
organization would remain unchanged. In double-loop
learning, on the other hand, the learners would do more;
each subsequent experience in the course of participation
would alter their concept of how the world around them
worked, changing their expectations and (consequently)
their strategies for dealing with the participatory pro-
cess as it proceeded.1 1
This concept is provocative because it gets to the
root of what learning is all about, rather than merely
dallying with the question of what has been learned.
Unfortunately, I did not examine my four communities
closely enough to make definitive statements about their
potential for double-loop learning. However, there are
indications that double-loop learning has manifested itself
in Renbaankwartier and Schilderswijk due to major changes
in the political orientations of those communities during
-82-
the period I studied.
This concludes the explanation of the five major
criteria I will use to evaluate the effectiveness of citi-
zen participation in The Hague. We will return to these
criteria in Chapter IV to exri ne in more detail how the
five participatory cases I studied fared in relation to
each criterion. Now, let us turn to the details of the
cases themselves.
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CHAPTER III
FIVE CASE STUDIES OF PARTICIPATORY
EXPERIENCES IN THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS
Renbaankwartier/Scheveningen:
Conflict Under the Guise of Participation
Scheveningen is one of the most famous seaside resorts
in Western Europe. It was partially reconstructed to suit
the needs of the tourist industry between 1918 and 1938,
but the period after 1960 saw a steady decline of the
resort. Decay along the waterfront and in the surrounding
residential areas resembles that of many ocean resorts in
the cooler parts of Europe and North America. (Cheap air-
fares to Spain have victimized Scheveningen just as cheap
airfares to Florida have hurt Atlantic City.)
The process I studied in this neighborhood was not
really a participation process at all, in light of our
definition of participation (see pp. 62-65). Conflict was
never replaced by cooperation; an atmosphere of respect
and trust did not develop between the city and the activ-
ists. The procedure which was adopted for involving cit-
izens was unsophisticated and very brief, providing little
opportunity for long-term citizen impact, community-wide
learning, or the democratization of neighborhood institu-
tions. Although some immediate gains were achieved, the
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process ended in acrimony: a clear case of participatory
effort in regression back toward open conflict.
The beach resort in Scheveningen is surrounded by a
ring of residential neighborhoods, which are in turn sep-
arated from the center of The Hague by parks. The res-
idential neighborhoods include multi-unit rental struc-
tures, attractive single-family homes, boarding houses,
pensions, small hotels, and several modest business dis-
tricts. One such neighborhood is Renbaankwartier, the
focus of this case.
Unlike the other districts I studied in The Hague,
Scheveningen is not poor, even by Dutch standards. Most
of the people could be called "middle-class", with a good
number of wealthy residents as well. There are, however,
a few pockets of immigrants and lower-class Dutch workers
who perform the low-skilled tasks which every resort re-
quires. Although some of the housing stock could use re-
habilitation, it is for the most part in good shape.
During the early 1960's, the largest single land-
holder in Scheveningen was the Zwolsman Company. As it
began to lose money, Zwolsman discussed several possible
renewal plans with the city. Eventually, however, the
company decided it did not want to undertake the renewal
(at least not on the city's terms) , and it put its prop-
erties up for sale.
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Three companies were interested in purchasing the
Zwolsman holdings. Each company discussed the future of
Scheveningen with city officials. The city insisted that
the purchasing company agree beforehand not only to renew
the beachfront, but also to preserve and upgrade the
resort's grandest hotel, the Kurhaus -- a huge white
elephant which was a symbol of the area's romantic past
and its present decline. Only one company, Bredero,
agreed to this stipulation. The company made the purchase,
accepted financial risk for the redevelopment project, and
put up fifty percent of the cash which would be needed.
In return, Bredero received permission to build
760,000 cubic meters in a designated area of Scheveningen.
They were allowed to build essentially anything they want-
ed: hotels, office buildings, or housing. The city and
Bredero reached agreement on a plan for the beachfront,
which included a maximum of 40,000 cubic feet of office
space. In addition, the government agreed to run a major
highway from The Hague to Scheveningen to allow for the
increased tourist traffic which the renewal was expected
to generate.
Business and citizens in Holland accept government
intrusion in economic affairs far more readily than do
Americans. However, despite a cultural acceptance of
government's dominant role, citizens are not always
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pleased with the outcome. Private deals between govern-
ment and big business are common; one hand frequently
washes the other. Such was the case with Bredero in
Scheveningen; we will see another such example with the
MAVOB corporation in Schilderswijk.
Neighborhood residents were outraged by the Bredero
plan. Although they were eager to see the beachfront re-
juvenated, they were equally concerned about the integrity
of their residential neighborhoods. The plan adopted by
the city and Bredero would have completely changed the
residential character of Scheveningen. Houses would be
torn down and not replaced. Luxury apartment complexes
and office towers would destroy the physical integrity of
the neighborhood and bring a wealthier class of residents
to Scheveningen. Traffic would increase, and safety for
children would decline.
The government claimed that the revitalization of
Scheveningen was vital to the city's economic well-being.
If the neighborhood was to be renewed, certain sacrifices
were required. In addition, the government noted that it
had set up a special citizen advisory panel to assist in
formulating the beachfront plan; this group was called
Inspraakgroep Scheveningen. The residents, however,
charged that most of the group's members came from outside
the neighborhood, and could not therefore presume to
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speak for the residents. (Inspraakgroep Scheveningen is
a good example of pseudo-participatory techniques dis-
cussed on p. 65. In the United States, we have certainly
seen similar examples of government-sponsored citizen
commissions essentially rubber-stamping municipal plans.)
A public hearing held in October 1976, revealed the
depth of citizen hostility toward the beachfront plans
and the proposed highway. The residents at the hearing
demanded changes in the beachfront proposal, a reversal
of the plan for highway construction, and a new detailed
plan to protect the residential parts of the neighborhood.
The city, however, refused to budge on the beachront and
highway plan, and it refused even to discuss the pos-
sibility of a new plan for the rest of Scheveningen.
Throughout this case, we will see examples of munic-
ipal recalcitrance pushing residents further and further
into a corner, radicalizing local groups, and polarizing
relations between the inhabitants and the city. The
government's actions were understandable, if inexcusable.
The stakes in Scheveningen were very high -- perhaps
higher than in any other neighborhood we will examine.
Scheveningen was a national symbol of The Hague; and the
resort's decline was a great embarrassment to City Hall.
Finding a suitable developer had been difficult, and city
planners and officials were pleased that they had succeed-
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ed. They were probably quite angry at the "ingratitude"
of the neighborhood's residents.
The four months after the October meeting saw in-
tense citizen mobilization. Spearheading this drive was
the organization Werkopbouwverband Scheveningen (WOS), a
counterpoint to Inspraakgroep Scheveningen; WOS was dom-
inated by the social/cultural workers who were active in
the neighborhood (see pp. 40-43 for a discussion of the
role of social/cultural workers in protest organizing).
The organization was at the end of a four or five-year
period of latency during which it had been absorbed by
internal conflict over authority and procedure, and had
allowed its agenda to be effectively set by city officials.
It had limited itself to minor discussions about rehabil-
itation in the residential quarters, and ineffectual pro-
test against the beachfront plan. Now, however, neighbor-
hood concern about the roadway and the beachfront, coupled
with an uneasy fear throughout the neighborhood that the
city was preparing to carve up the residential quarters
for more offices and luxury housing, led to a radical-
ization of WOS -- at least temporarily.
Among the most militant members of WOS were the
representatives from Renbaankwartier, an old district
particularly near the beachfront. The city had stead-
fastly refused to discuss the future of Renbaankwartier
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with WOS, claiming that the quarter did not belong to
"Scheveningen Village", which was the city-recognized
"turf" of WOS. The residents believed the reason for this
refusal to discuss Renbaankwartier was more sinister: the
city was willing to make at least minor commitments to
the residential integrity of the other parts of the
Scheveningen Village, but it wanted to eventually seize
most of the prime land in Renbaankwartier, tear down the
housing, and extend the beachfront plans to include this
area.
In February 1977, a major public meeting was held
in the Circus Theatre in Scheveningen. Over 1,000 people
showed up, and some were refused admittance due to the
size of the crowd. Residents came from all parts of
Scheveningen and formulated three demands to present to
the municipality:
1) the beachfront plan must not be extended further,
and the road must not be built;
2) demolition of houses must cease; and
3) the physical harmony of the neighborhood must be
maintained (i.e. no more high-rise of fic'e or
apartment towers, and replacement housing at
affordable rents for those displaced).
Meanwhile, the people of Renbaankwartier formed their
own organization, Residents' Council for Renbaankwartier
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(Bewoners'Beraad Renbaankwartier, BBR), to deal spec-
ifically with their own area. This organization began
action in earnest to press not only for the demands of
the meeting, but also for a separate city plan which
would specifically protect the residential integrity of
Renbaankwartier. The organization held sit-ins on the
resort's major pier. It drafted a letter, signed by
respected members of the community, asserting that Mayor
Schol of The Hague was not welcome to set foot in
Renbaankwartier. BBR sought out the help of the press,
and organized strategy meetings.
American observers may be surprised by the mild
forms of protest. In the context of Dutch society, how-
ever, such actions were major departures from normal
deference to government authority (see pp. 22-25). Sur-
prising as we may find it, Dutch officials were shocked
at such brazen protests (not only in Scheveningen, but in
other neighborhoods throughout the country), and they were
eventually forced to respond.
BBR divided into five separate working groups. The
first publicized the group's demands outside the neighbor-
hood; the second published a newspaper for the neighbor-
hood itself. A third group coordinated protest actions.
The final groups documented changes which were taking
place in the neighborhood and explored the history of
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redevelopment in Scheveningen.
After arguing about the powers and composition of
a governing board, BBR agreed to have no single board in
control. As might have been expected, however, a cadre
of active members rose to positions of control, calling
frequent neighborhood meetings to discuss strategy and
positions. The leader of the group was L. Pronk, a
doctoral candidate from the Royal University at Leiden.
Significantly, Pronk's dissertation dealt with the com-
plex Dutch procedure for appealing municipal decisions
to the province and the national government (see pp. 34-38
for a discussion of this process). In the course of
the next several years, BBR would use the appeal process
masterfully to stymie municipal plans.
After several months of action, BBR located a
leverage point which forced the city to bow to its demands.
Scheveningen Village was under authority of a "preparation
decision", a temporary ordinance in which the City Council
mandated careful review of all requests for private build-
ing permits while a municipal planning process was in pro-
gress (see pp. 30-31 for an explanation of the role of pre-
paration ordinances in the planning process). The city
had been preparing a plan for Scheveningen Village (in
which it refused to include Renbaankwartier), and it
needed an extension of the preparation ordinance in order
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to continue its work.
The City Council, however, refused to grant the
extension unless the municipal government included
Renbaankwartier in Scheveningen Village. The College
(i.e. the mayor and aldermen) at first refused, but they
finally agreed to prepare a separate plan for
Renbaankwartier. The Council then insisted that the
executive accept the three demands of the February 1977
meeting, and complete the plan for Renbaankwartier within
one year. The mayor and aldermen backed down, and the
deal was struck. However, they would not soon forget
the deal was forced on them. Although the very people
involved in the Renbaankwartier process had agreed to
participation schemes in other parts of the city, they
began the participation process in Renbaankwartier on
a uniquely sour note.
Reluctantly, the city officials contacted BBR to
prepare for a process of consultation. Immediately, a
conflict arose concerning the boundaries of the area to
be included in the plan for Renbaankwartier, with the
city demanding that certain streets be excluded. BBR
agreed, but explained that if the city did anything to
those streets which damaged Renbaankwartier, there would
be an immediate return to protest.
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The "consultation group" was to consist of one
resident from Belgischepark (another Scheveningen
neighborhood, part of which was included in the
Renbaankwartier planning district), two residents from
Renbaankwartier itself, one storekeeper, one pension/
hotel owner, one representative from the building company
involved in the planning process, and one representative
from the City Development Agency. Although initial con-
tacts began in July 1977, the actual meetings did not
begin until November. The major concession extracted
by BBR regarding the process itself was that all meetings
would be open to the public.
Six meetings were held, all during the month of
November. There is disagreement about attendance. Pronk
claims about 100 people attended each meeting; city
officials believe the figure was closer to an average of
thirty. Once, the procedure appeared on the verge of
breaking down completely, as members of the group charged
that the city's representative lied about municipal plans
for the adjoining neighborhood of Seinpostduin. The city
countered with the charge that it could not possibly
reveal everything BBR wanted to know if the meetings were
kept public. At one point, Michel Hardon, the Alderman
for Physical Planning and Urban Renewal, invited Pronk to
his office for a private meeting; but Pronk arrived with
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thirty citizens, boldly demonstrating his insistence on
the public character of all contacts with the city.
Finally, after a month of agreement on certain
points and persistent bickering on others, BBR told the
city to finalize its plan. The group would take any
remaining complaints it had to the City Council, as
well as provincial and national authorities.
The plan set a maximum height for future construction
in Renbaankwartier; no building may be more than one
floor higher than the current housing stock. There will
be no more hotels, pensions, or office buildings con-
structed in the quarter. There is no ban on demolition,
but the building restrictions mentioned above greatly
reduce the financial incentives which could lead to
massive demolition. Although limits have been placed on
rent levels, there are still quarrels about the details
of this stipulation.
On other issues, however, BBR was less successful.
The city has adopted no official policy to preserve the
low-income housing which currently exists in
Renbaankwartier, or to ensure replacement housing for
people who may be forced to move. There are currently
several factories and schools in the area; the residents
do not mind if these remain -- but if they close, BBR
wants the city to promise to construct low-income
-97-
housing in their place. The city claims it does not
have the funds to make such a commitment. These issues
will have to be fought out at higher levels.
There can be little doubt that BBR will fight hard,
not only through demonstrations and publicity, but also
through use of the appeals process. When BBR disliked
certain provisions of the plan for nearby Seinpostduin,
it filed no less than 1100 individual complaints with
higher authorities; the Seinpostduin citizen organization
filed only 500.
In many ways, the Renbaankwartier participation
procedure fell short of an ideal process. It failed to
involve a large number of citizens in a long-term plan-
ning effort for the neighborhood. After the one month
participation process, the City Development Agency
worked by itself for another six months before producing
a draft plan. Although the residents accomplished some
of their objectives, critical guarantees about housing,
rents, and demolition were not obtained.
Conflict between the residents and their city
government has not been replaced by trust, not even by
tolerance. Conflicts continued throughout the process,
and BBR has promised to carry the fight even further now
that the plan is finished. Although Renbaankwartier
itself is safeguarded by aspects of the new plan, the
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surrounding neighborhoods of Scheveningen are gentrify-
ing rapidly, with luxury apartment houses and office
buildings sprouting along most major streets. Although
the roadway has been stopped, that appeared totally un-
connected with the participation effort itself; it was
the demonstrations and protests which stopped the high-
way.
In fact, most of the successes of WOS, BBR, and the
other residential organizations of Scheveningen appear to
stem from conflicts with the city, rather than participa-
tion. This does not mean that participation was useless:
on the contrary, it served to formalize and tie down
victories which the residents had already won in the
streets and meeting halls of the neighborhood. Further-
more, BBR's insistence on public meetings confirmed the
residents' determination not to be co-opted by attending
carefully-orchestrated meetings in the conference rooms
of municipal agencies. However, the insistence on public
disclosure may well have reduced the degree to which
participation could actually influence critical planning
decisions. In Schilderswijk, for example, many impor-
tant pro-neighborhood compromises have been struck behind
closed doors, distasteful as this process may be.
Participation in Renbaankwartier did not replace
conflict as the dominant mode of action in the community.
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Resident-municipal relationships are no more productive
or stable today than they were ten years ago. Pronk was
unexpectedly candid in telling me that there is no trust
for the city in his neighborhood. He has no confidence
in the recently-passed "participation by-law" which
formalizes citizen participation throughout The Hague;
in fact, he assumes it will be used to co-opt residents'
groups and win support for city plans. "The mayor and
aldermen have not learned anything yet," he asserts.
He still speaks in terms of "using people's anger" to
gain support for BBR actions, and of "showing your strength
when the chips are down".1
This is not to say that the skillful management of
conflict by a citizen's organization is a bad thing; on
the contrary, it is critical in a pluralistic society.
However, there are certain goals which we ascribe to
participation which conflict cannot attain.
Some of these objectives were discussed in Chapter
II. A participatory process can give residents an
opportunity to build up a store of legitimacy with
municipal authorities, increasing the likelihood that
they will be called upon to help shape the neighborhood's
future in the long term. BBR has built up very little
legitimacy at City Hall. Participation can also lead
to democratization of neighborhood institutions through
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the need which exists to delegate participatory tasks
and maintain an image of representativeness; conflict
usually depends more heavily upon powerful leaders who
made decisions for, but not with, the community. A
small cadre of leaders seems to dominate decision-
making in Renbaankwartier. In addition, a sophisticated
participation process can give citizens throughout the
community important learning opportunities. The resi-
dents of Renbaankwartier had few such chances. To the
degree that conflict has crowded out real participation
in Scheveningen, the community has been the loser -- and
the city as a whole.
Schipperskwartier: Participation as
a New Form of Paternalism
Schipperskwartier is an inner-city neighborhood of
The Hague. It is much smaller than Scheveningen. The
housing is older and in worse condition. On the whole,
the people are less well-off, and there is little to
distinguish the neighborhood as an attractive place to
live.
The participatory process adopted in Schipperskwar-
tier was, in many respects, more successful than that in
Scheveningen. The process has lasted for several years,
and it has resulted in real gains for the residents,
although most of these gains are still in the form of
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plans to improve the neighborhood physically. Other
possible accomplishments of participation (such as
neighborhood democratization and community-wide learning)
are not strongly indicated. Most importantly, it is
possible that the municipal paternalism which charac-
terized early planning for Schipperskwartier has been
replaced by the paternalistic way in which action group
-leaders treat the residents of their own neighborhood.
Schipperskwartier, which translates into English as
"the captains' quarter", borders broad canals which form
an inner-city harbor. Adjacent to one of the city's
two main railroad stations and bordered on two sides by
major access roads, Schipperskwartier is therefore at the
very nexus of rail, automotive, and water traffic for the
city. As such, the land is valuable -- coveted by many
private development companies, and the city itself.
Planning for the neighborhood in the early 1970's
involved the type of paternalism which was so common in
Dutch planning at that time. The city decided that the
neighborhood was "blighted" and had to be radically
altered in character. Housing would be torn down and
office buildings constructed in its place. The quarter
would be made "more physically attractive" , so that
drivers approaching The Hague's central business district
would have a more pleasant view in the morning. The
Rijswijkseweg, one of the bordering access roads (and
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one of the most treacherous thoroughfares I have ever
had the displeasure to negotiate) would be widened to
accommodate even greater traffic.
In 1973, the neighborhood rose to action. Led by
the social/cultural workers from the communiter center
Vliethage, they formed a residents' organization: Action
Group for the Forgotten Village (Actiegroep Vergetendorp,
AV). For three years, the action group's demonstrations
and publicity had little effect; fortunately, implementa-
tion of the plans also lagged behind schedule. Finally,
the city agreed to a participatory process; representa-
tives from the City Development Agency, one member of the
City Council, and three residents sat down at a table to
bargain about the future of the Forgotten Village.
Almost immediately, the process broke down. The
residents walked out of the meeting, refusing to come
back until the city promised that the residential charac-
ter of Schipperskwartier would not be compromised. The
city gave in, and the residents returned, presenting
their specific demands:
1) no widening of the Rijswijkseweg;
2) preservation of the houses near the road;
3) a very limited amount of industry and commercial
buildings would be allowed into the neighborhood
-- nothing that could compromise the residential
character of Schipperskwartier; and
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4) preservation of the harbor area.
I was not able to find a definitive explanation of
why the municipality gave in when it did, although there
is reason to believe that effective political organizing
by AV eventually threatened to hurt the incumbent alder-
men at the polls, particularly in light of a well-executed
publicity campaign.
The government and the social/cultural workers then
set up a process for continuing participation. A "con-
sultation group meeting" (overleggroep vercardering) was
established, including representation from the City
Development Agency, AV, citizens themselves, business,
the housing association which would build any new housing
in the neighborhood (see pp. 27-28 for a discussion of
housing associations), and a representative from the
office of Michel Hardon, the planning and renewal alderman.
Each member of the group had equal status, although
the City Development Agency would present "starting-
points" at meetings, in other words, recommended plans
for the overleggroep to consider. Sometimes the group
accepted the starting-points of the agency (with or
without making amendments) . At other times, the members
of the group could not agree, in which case the views of
the various parties would be passed on to the College of
Mayor and Aldermen for a decision. In all cases, the
final judgment remained with the Town Council.
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The consultation group has produced a structure
plan for the neighborhood which satisfies many of the
demands outlined above. The main points of the plan are
as follows:
1) The houses along the Rijswijkseweg and in the
south will be rehabilitated.
2) All other housing in the neighborhood will be
demolished and replaced by a new style which blends with
the old buildings; no high-rise apartment buildings.
3) Most of the parking for cars will be provided
along the streets, but thirty percent of necessary
parking spaces will be provided under the houses in drive-
in carports.
4) The Vliethage community center will remain un-
touched.
5) A system of parks has been agreed upon. (This
was a particularly thorny issue, which was resolved only
after the architect proposed a compromise plan which
both the residents and the city reluctantly accepted.)
6) Low rents are more important than the beauty or
soundness of construction. The city is still complaining
about the physical character of many of the buildings,
and the materials being used.
7) Sixty percent of the new units will be one- or
two-bedrooms in size; the other forty percent will be
larger. Originally, the city wanted a fifty-fifty split
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in order to attract more young families into the city;
AV, on the other hand, wanted seventy percent small
units and only thirty percent with more than two bedrooms.
Both parties moved their positions by ten percent in order
to reach the sixty-forty compromise.
The structure plan is now complete, and a "parcelling-
out study" (another step in the detailed process of Dutch
planning; see p. 31 ) is now being worked out. How-
ever, City Development workers and independent researchers
at the Delft Technical University are skeptical of the
results which have been achieved so far. They doubt that
the social/cultural workers in Actiegroep Vergetendorp
have adequately consulted with the people in the neigh-
borhood, who appear to want more rehabilitation than AV
is calling for, and who may also be interested in
higher-quality construction even if rents are slightly
higher. 2
The City Development Agency tried to get residents
to attend the regular meetings, but AV would discourage
residents from attending. They claim to have held their
own meetings without city presence, where the residents
made their feelings known. Nonetheless, some officials
believe AV bullied residents into accepting their own
ideas of what would be best for the neighborhood. City
officials have not canvassed or surveyed the neighborhood
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(as they did in Shilderswijk) to learn resident feeling
about rent levels, parking, building design, parks,
schools, traffic, etc. They must take the word of a
handful of AV social workers, who have dominated every
meeting with the city. They doubt that any learning has
taken place in the community as a whole as a result of
the participation process, even though -- on paper at
least -- the process was similar to the one adopted in
Schilderswijk (to be discussed later in this chapter).
Whereas the city officials complained that the
process in Renbaankwartier was too open to the public,
the lack of public input in Schipperskwartier is making
City Development officials nervous; they fear the resi-
dents may suddenly discover they do not like the new plans
and place the blame on the city alone, and not AV. The
action group retains a sort of hero status in the commu-
nity as the tiny group of underdogs which overturned the
city's original plan for the Forgotten Village.
Two researchers have attributed some of the results
of the Schipperskwartier process to the communist sympa-
thies of the opbouwwerkers at Vliethage. Communist
activists in old Dutch neighborhoods have a very negative
image of the districts in which they work. In their
struggle to achieve a new social order, they want all
physical vestiges of the past torn down -- even if the
opinions of the residents are less radical. 3
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Up to this point, the respect which the city has
for the political strength of the AV has prevented it
from taking any action to challenge the group's leaders.
Alderman Hardon is aware of the political damage which
the group caused to his predecessor, and he is apparently
unwilling to risk its wrath.
For the people of Schipperskwartier, however, two
questions remain even after a supposedly open participa-
tory process has been completed. The first is whether
the new plan truly serves their interests and meets their
desires. The second, and more important from our point
of view, is whether the paternalistic planning of the
city has merely been replaced by a new form of paternalism
on the part of the social workers -- who are not neces-
sarily representative of the residents in terms of housing
demands, class or income, and political affiliation.
Molenwijk: Participation with an Ulterior Motive
Molenwijk, "the windmill neighborhood", is an area
just south of the city center, filled with low-rise
apartment buildings. The housing stock is solid, but the
units are small, frequently lacking showers and gardens
(in Holland the latter may be more important to most
people than the former).
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The participatory process in Molenwijk is highly ela-
borate and thoughtfully constructed. There is a good
potential for community learning, and special efforts have
been made to include women, children, and foreign immigrants
in the planning process -- with varying degrees of success.
The actual outcome of the procedure, however, will result
in significant displacement, as well as hardship for foreign
residents of the community. Many residents are using a
regulation in Dutch planning law to escape from the neighbor-
hood after it is renewed; this ulterior motive has tainted
the process, and reduced sensitivity to the needs of
immigrants and native Dutchmen who would prefer to remain in
Molenwijk.
The presence of foreign immigrants is a particularly
thorny issue in Molenwijk. Both guest workers from Southern
Europe and North Africa, and immigrants from the former
Dutch colony of Surinam began moving into Molenwijk at a
rapid pace during the late 1960's, to the distress of long-
time Dutch residents. The foreigners have many habits and
customs which the Dutch find offensive. They live together
in very large families, speak different languages, and com-
pete with Dutch natives for jobs. On the whole, Dutchmen
do not like the outsiders; they think they are dirty and
uncivilized, and they are willing to tell you so.
Molenwijk, like Schipperskwartier, is a relatively
poor neighborhood. About sixty percent of the residents
are below Dutch minimum income standards. Unlike the other
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neighborhoods in my study, the initial action of Molenwijk's
citizens did not occur in response to an existing government
plan. Actiegroep Laakkwartier (the name of the primary
action group in Molenwijk) was apparently started five or
six years ago simply because people wanted the city to fix
up their deteriorating and inadequate housing, especially
in light of the fact that a large percentage of the units
were publicly owned.
A technical evaluation of the housing indicated that
.it was essentially sound. Therefore, a combined strategy
of renovation and new construction has been decided upon
for Molenwijk.
Actiegroep Laakkwartier (AL) was originally established
by social/cultural workers and other interested persons in
the neighborhood. As time passed, however, the social
workers became the most active members of the group.
Purportedly, average citizens had trouble following the
technical nature of many of the conversations.
A consultation group consisting of AL members and City
Development representatives conducted the participation
process. Together, the members and the city chose an
architect to work on the plan. Eventually, the residents
hired a consulting group called "Planwinkel" (or the "plan
store") from Delft to provide them with technical informa-
tion, establish a better participation process for new
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construction in certain parts of Molenwijk, and to run a
project which seeks to involve school children in planning
the neighborhood's future (more on this later).
AL and Planwinkel have attempted to broaden the base
of the participatory process. They have established sub-
groups to do initial planning in specific subject areas
(such as social welfare services and schools), or to perform
certain functions (like providing information about the
planning process to residents). Each month, the consultation
group meets in two public sessions: the first is a general
meeting to make progress with the city on neighborhood
plans; the second meeting provides an in-depth discussion
of a particular planning issue. Many of the meetings are
held during the day, giving housewives in the area maximum
opportunity to participate (very few Dutch wives work outside
the home).
Special efforts have been made to involve foreigners.
All of Planwinkel's documents are printed in Dutch, Turkish,
and Arabic. Simultaneous translation in meetings has been
attempted. One social worker keeps in regular touch with
foreign residents of the community. On the whole, however,
few foreigners come to meetings, and none is a regular
member of the action group.
At first, I was surprised at the apparent passivity
of the people in dealing with the municipality. There seemed
to be no major conflict. Although the techniques of partici-
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pation were highly elaborated (involving publicity, expert
assistance, special discussion sessions, etc.), the meetings
routinely accepted the recommendations of city workers. I
was amazed to hear that the new houses which are being con-
structed will be fancier than those in Schilderswijk or
Schipperskwartier, and the rents will be much higher as well.
In fact, Planwinkel estimates that about half the people
currently living in Molenwijk will not be able to afford
the new housing. There will also be fewer units in the
neighborhood after renewal is completed (although this reduc-
tion in total number of units will occur in most renewed
neighborhoods). Why would a well-organized group of resi-
dents demand that the city renew their entire neighborhood,
and yet not complain when the rents are forced to exorbitant
levels? In other parts of the city (and throughout Holland)
citizen groups have demanded, and often obtained, extra
subsidies from the national government to cover increased
post-renewal rents, or they have demanded less fancy renewal
in order to keep rents low.
I discussed this issue with three people: two city
workers and one planner from Planwinkel. In each case, their
astounding answer was the same. The people did not really
care, because they did not plan to remain here after the
renewal process is completed. Under Dutch planning law, the
government must provide a family with a comparable housing
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unit at similar cost if it cannot provide housing in the
renewal zone. Had there been no renewal, the people would
not have been able to leave Molenwijk -- and leaving was
the real objective for most of them.
They do not like living in their present neighborhood.
After all, the housing is crowded, the infrastructure is
sub-standard, and they find the foreigners annoying. If the
neighorhood is renewed, the government will have to find
them a living situation elsewhere. The new unit should be
comparable, and it might be better.
It is not surprising, therefore, that few people are
overly concerned about the future of Molenwijk. Some will
remain, of course -- those who enjoy living near the city
center and have the money to pay the higher rents. The end
result is simple to predict: fewer units at higher rents
yields a wealthier population. In fact, the numbers bear
out this trend. In one part of northern Molenwijk, an area
of 500 families is being demolished; only forty of these
families are expected to return to the new units.
The strategy of the Molenwijkers to escape from their
neighborhood is not without risk. Despite the letter of
the law, it is often impossible for municipalities to find
new housing of comparable quality and cost for displaced
residents; there may be years of waiting. For the white
Dutch residents who are eager to leave Molenwijk, the risk
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is worth taking. Although they might not be fully satisfied
with the quality of their new unit, they can always apply
for subsidies to reduce the cost; and at least they will
be living in an area with fewer foreigners.
The picture is less rosy for the foreigners themselves.
In Holland, as in the U.S., government policy is frequently
bent to the will of the strongest -- and foreigners are last
on the totem pole. There are many neighborhoods which
actively and successfully resist "immigrant incursions", and
most housing associations (which control a large percentage
of Dutch housing units) impose low quotas on the numbers of
foreigners they will admit. The foreigners fear that the
government will not try particularly hard to find them
suitable replacement housing at a price they can afford.
Some may have tomove to Schilderswijk, which is already con-
gested with the city's highest concentration of immigrants.
Others fear they will be moved far from family and friends,
upon whom they depend in the midst of a strange culture.
There are also native Dutch residents who will suffer:
those who have low incomes and want to remain in Molenwijk.
The elderly, who are rarely involved in Dutch partcipation
schemes, are one probable example, although I have been un-
able to determine their view of the situation in Molenwijk.
Planwinkel claims to have conducted research into the
satisfaction of residents who have recently left Molenwijk
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-- finding out that eighty to ninety percent of them are
satisfied with their new surroundings.4 Foreigners, however,
generally do not respond to such surveys, and the destina-
tion of many Molenwijkers is hard to trace.
The Molenwijk case left me with mixed feelings. A
sensitive and elaborate participation process had been
created, one which held great promise for improving the
neighborhood in accordance with community wishes and foster-
ing a great deal of citizen learning about the planning
process and the urban environment. The neighborhood is
undergoing a significant physical renewal, through carefully
balanced rehabilitation and new construction. The future
of Molenwijk as a physical space looks bright.
On the other hand, the purpose of participation is
being corrupted by a quirk in legal regulations. Many people
who are doing the planning are not even planning to stay!
Many of those who may be forced to leave are not involved
in the process, or cannot understand how the process will
affect them. The contradictions of this situation made one
of Planwinkel's major efforts in the community seem all the
more ironic:
Planwinkel, in cooperation with Actiegroep Laakkwartier
and the local schools, is conducting an experiment to in-
volve children in the planning process for Molenwijk. When
buildings are torn down, the children paint murals on blank
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walls. The teachers divide their classes into small groups
which are asked to come up with solutions to simple renewal
problems, based on information provided by Planwinkel and
the instructors. The children produce pictures, reports,
and exhibitions which are used to explain the renewal pro-
cess to members of the community. Perhaps most importantly,
the children bring information about the renewal process to
their parents, trying to get the entire family involved.
This is especially useful in the case of foreigners, since
their children are able to present information to the
parents in their own language.
The idea is to get the children involved in the life
of their community, to make them feel a part of the change
which is occurring in Molenwijk. Since youth vandalism and
arson are problems in the neighborhood, Planwinkel hopes
that these crimes can be reduced in years to come if young
people learn to take greater pride in their neighborhood.
This hope may be valid -- but only if the children, and
their parents, remain in Molenwijk. If they leave, the les-
sons (if they are at all transferable) will leave with them.
Schilderswijk I: Co-Production in Action
"The Schilderswijk is generally considered to be the
largest continuous urban problem area in The Netherlands."
5
Housing density is very high, and most of the structures
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were built in the second half of the nineteenth century
before strict building codes were in force. Schilderswijk
is inhabited largely by low-income groups, including
immigrants from Surinam and guest workers from Turkey,
Morocco, and other Mediterranean countries. The city
claims that immigrants account for forty percent of the
population of Schilderswijk, although some native Dutch
residents claim the figure is closer to fifty or sixty
percent. Young people form an unusually large percentage
of the population of the neighborhood.
The neighborhood is bordered on one side by the
central business district of The Hague, and on the other
side by a railway complex. It is both physically and
socially isolated from the rest of the city. Since 1960,
the area has suffered a considerable reduction in popula-
tion and housing stock, although the rapid influx of
immigrants during the last five years may be pushing the
population above its low-mark of 40,000 in the early
1970's.
The Schilderswijk case can be divided into two
separate participatory experiences. The first involved
city officials and the organization Payable Rents in the
development of a plan for two low-income housing complexes
in the Oranjeplein area of Schilderswijk. The second
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concerned the development of a structure-plan for all of
Schilderswijk; the principal (but not the only) citizen
group involved in this participatory effort was Residents'
Organization Oranjeplein-Schilderswijk (Bewoners Organizatie
Oranjeplein-Schilderswijk, BOS), an outgrowth of Payable
Rents.
Concerted protest by the residents of Schilderswijk
preceded each participatory effort. In each case, municipal
willingness to set a participatory process in motion re-
sulted directly from the conflict which the citizens waged.
First, we will consider the Oranjeplein participation pro-
cess which developed housing complexes for the Jacob
Catstraat and the Gort Molen, replacing city plans which
would have displaced many persons and radically changed
the character of the neighborhood.
There are several important themes to the Oranjeplein
experience. Both the city and the action group Payable
Rents agreed in writing to a series of goals for the
neighborhood (and a process for carrying out these goals)
before participation began. Once the participatory process
commenced, conflict between the city and the neighborhood
declined significantly, although a certain level of conflict
among various groups in the neighborhood continued.
The procedure resulted in significant changes in plans
for the neighborhood, and these plans have already been
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implemented. Payable Rents (and, more generally, the
citizens of the neighborhood) became legitimate parties to
renewal planning and implementation, although this status
proved temporary in nature. Significant learning has taken
place within the community and among city workers as well.
The organizational base of Schilderswijk has been strength-
ened. Unfortunately, there were only minor signs that the
process democratized community institutions.
The Oranjeplein participation process did not spring
from a vacuum. For several years prior to the unveiling
of the city's plan for the area, relations between the
city and Schilderswijk were tense. On several occasions,
municipal planners had made "forays" into the neighborhood
in an effort to change its social and physical texture in
ways which would have adversely affected the current
residents. The most notable of these attempts- involved
efforts to widen streets and route more traffic through
the neighborhood -- especially on one particular street,
the Falckstraat. Citizens organized meetings and protests
to let the city officials know that the residents did not
want more cars on their streets. In the case of the
Falckstraat, the city backed down. It did not always,
however.
In two cases directly on the borders of Schilderswijk,
the city ignored protests and implemented its plans. Old,
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"blighted" neighborhoods were torn down. Roads were
widened, luxury apartment houses were built, and major
institutions (specifically, a hospital and a technical
school) expanded in these two areas, which are known
as Stieltjestraat and Kortenbos. Estimates of the
total number of residents displaced from these two small
neighborhoods run as high as 12,000 people.
Thus, when the city presented its dismemberment
plans for Schilderswijk, the community already possessed
an indigenous cadre of protest leaders and two nearby
examples of what would happen if they remained silent.
Stieltjestraat and Kortenbos were vivid proof that the
low-income, working-class population of the central Hague
was being uprooted. If the process was allowed to begin
in Schilderswijk, the social base for protest would swiftly
be reduced. Not only would buildings and streets be lost,
but so would the people who would be needed to protest
further evictions. The time for action had arrived, and
it could not be delayed.
The plan which the city put forward in 1971 for the
renewal of Oranjeplein was the latest in a series of ill-
fated plans dating back to 1953. This newest plan was the
brain-child of a powerful private development company
called MAVOB. The plan called for the demolition of the
entire neighborhood, replacing it with high-rise towers
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filled with high-rent units. MAVOB agreed to put up all
the money to prepare a more detailed plan, plus a sub-
stantial amount of capital for the project itself. Through
its close ties to the provincial planning agency, MAVOB
could guarantee the city that the plan would receive
provincial approval -- a particularly important bargaining
point, since the province had recently been quite displeased
with planning efforts in The Hague.
The city apparently never argued that displacement
would not occur; it realized that the plan would radically
alter the physical and social fabric of the neighborhood.
It frequently claimed, however, that the plan was absolutely
essential to rejuvenating the core business district by
bringing in a clientele with money to spend. It further
argued that the city would benefit from a greater mixing
of social classes (although the gentrification of Kortenbos
and Stieljestraat had provided more displacement than
mixing). These "planning philosophies" may have played a
role in the city's adoption of the MAVOB plan, but there
were also less philosophical factors at work: a politically
powerful development company saw a good chance to make
money at the expense of the residents of Oranjeplein, and
the city could not resist the scheme. After all, it was
guaranteed provincial approval, a free planning process,
and lots of private capital for the venture itself. As a
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final sweetener, the president of a major housing association
sat on the Town Council; there was little doubt that his
organization would have played a prominent role in the
MAVOB project.
Protest in Schilderswijk took several forms. Of course,
there were demonstrations and skillful use of the media.
Perhaps most important, however, the action group Payable
Rents decided to produce a viable alternative plan for
Oranjeplein. I have not been able to find a similar example
of a pre-participation attempt to produce an alternative
plan in any other neighborhood of the city. The genesis
of this alternative plan was significant in several respects.
At the time of the protests, the city asserted that
it was impossible to create a plan for new housing in
Schilderswijk at rent levels which the current tenants could
afford. Payable Rents might have been content to merely
protest the city's plan. This was, after all, the tactic
which had been followed by many citizen groups in The
Hague. However, this particular organization decided to
challenge the assertions of the politicians and their
planning experts by drafting a plan of its own. In a
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sense, they decided to play ball in the opponent's park.
Despite the distrust residents displayed for city
officials, they accepted the informal (and sometimes
secret) assistance of several city workers and employees
of the architectural firm which had made the original
plan. These professional helpers joined the residents
in the evenings to expose flaws in the plan and to recom-
mend alternative solutions which would involve lower rents.
This cooperation indicated that the leaders of
Payable Rents were willing to work with outside allies.
On the other hand, the group retained all decision-making
authority, and would not allow the outside professionals
to become anything more than strictly advisory. This
balanced policy toward outside assistance would serve the
group well in the future, encouraging contacts with the
outside world (and the city government, specifically)
while avoiding domination of the group by outside experts.
The alternative plan was not a comprehensive planning
document. It was a political strategy -- one in a series
of tools for conflict with the city. It outlined three
key principles, conditions which the residents considered
indispensable for a satisfactory renewal of their neighbor-
hood:
a) rents must be affordable by the current inhabi-
tants;
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b) current residents must have priority for new units;
and
c) any new architecture must blend in with the old
(e.g., no high-rise apartments in Oranjeplein).
It also presented some ways in which these goals might be
achieved -- enough to be persuasive, but not enough to
fulfill the rigorous demands of a real plan. The plan
was valuable not because it provided a definitive explana-
tion of how to renew Oranjeplein, but because it drew a
base-line along which future planning might proceed.
For months, the city refused to bargain with the
residents. It insisted that any plan featuring lower rents
was impractical, and that the MAVOB plan was necessary for
the economic welfare of the city as a whole. In an effort
to calm the troubled waters of Schilderswijk (and save
the MAVOB plan), the new Minister of Housing and Physical
Planning, B. J. Udink, decided to visit the neighborhood
for a personal tour. Wherever he went in Schilderswijk,
people greeted him with black flags flying from their
windows -- a sign of the residents' united disapproval of
the MAVOB plan. The incident attracted nationwide media
attention. Shortly after his visit, Udink agreed to in-
crease the subsidies available to the development project,
thereby reducing the projected post-renewal rents.
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The Hague could now argue that the current residents could
afford the new units.
Schilderswijk legend and lore attributes the Minister's
action to the hanging of the black flags; undoubtedly, this
had strong impact. However, other factors were also at
work. Early in the planning process, some of the architects
working on the project became restless, and began to ques-
tion the soundness of the plan. They claimed they could
not keep the rents anywhere near a level which the current
residents might be able to afford under the guidelines
MAVOB had given them. The developers had to quiet the
architects down. Therefore, MAVOB officials visited their
close friends at the Ministry and convinced Udink's pre-
decessor to guarantee informally that adequate subsidies
would be provided to keep post-renewal rents reasonable.
When Udink came to office, he refused to recognize the
action of his predecessor. As the protests became more
serious, however, he came under tremendous pressure from
MAVOB, The Hague, and other parties to change his mind
and grant the subsidies. The black flags incident was
apparently the final factor which changed Udink's mind.
His action, however, failed to defuse the situation.
The leaders of Payable Rents would not budge from their
original position. They made their stand on three key
points:
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a) if the same subsidies were applied to their
alternative plan, rents would be even lower;
b) the buildings in MAVOB's plan are still too tall
and entirely out of character with the surrounding neigh-
borhood; and
c) the residents wanted more rehabilitation and less
demolition.
The impasse did not break until the spring of 1972,
when they alderman in charge of urban renewal, W. Nuy,
finally agreed to a series of four working sessions at
which the city and Payable Rents could work out a set of
mutually-acceptable renewal goals. Nuy and city planners
would represent The Hague, and representatives from Payable
Rents would speak for the residents.
Undoubtedly, Nuy was tiring of continued protest over
the MAVOB plan. Perhaps he feared political damage to his
own reputation if he allowed the impasse to continue. These
factors seem inadequate, however, to explain Nuy's sudden
turn-around. An additional factor may have been the action
group's success in stymieing Nuy's attempt to hold a public
hearing to discuss the plan. Nuy felt he could prove that
the action group was not representative of the people of
the neighborhood; but Payable Rents mounted a boycott of
the public hearings. When only journalists and city
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workers showed up, Nuy began to understand the depth of
resident feeling against the MAVOB plan.
Whatever additional convincing Nuy may have needed
was provided by the same group of architects discussed
earlier. They drafted a letter from their firm
(Buro van Tijen) to the local government stating two
simple points: a) they had warned The Hague that the
plan was unreasonable for the current residents, and b)
even with Udink's new subsidies, the current specifications
could never produce reasonable rents. They brought it to
one of their directors and threatened to resign and go to
the newspapers if he did not sign it; he signed, and the
letter was sent.6 Nuy was left with little choice but to
enter into negotiations with Payable Rents.
The outcome of the four working sessions was a doel-
stellingennota, or a "declaration of intents" agreed to in
writing by both sides. The declaration committed the
parties to a set of goals (afforable rents, priority for
the current residents, improved housing conditions, a
harmonious physical environment, adequate park space, and
no increase in through-traffic) and a series of steps for
jointly reaching these objectives. The first step was to
make a global plan which would explain, in approximate
terms, what the area would look like after renewal, and
how that end-point would be achieved. Step two involved
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adding detail to the global plan. The third step was to
set up a mechanism for distributing the new housing units.
Finally, the buildings would be constructed, along with
various amenities, and the units would be distributed.
The process for consultation which the parties
agreed upon was far from spectacular. It was a two-tiered
process, with representatives of the action group, the
municipality, the housing associations, and the architects
working together on a Building/Design Committee which had
to review all aspects of the plan. After proposals were
worked out in the Building/Design Committee, they went for
review to a Steering Committee -- on which residents were
initially not allowed to sit.
Payable Rents soon became very dissatisfied with their
lack of members on the Steering Committee. They therefore
decided to stall every proposal which came before the Build-
ing/Design Committee, until Nuy granted them positions on
the Steering Committee as well. After that, the planning
process proceeded smoothly. Eventually, plans were pre-
pared for two low-rent housing developments in the
Oranjeplein. The Town Council approved the plans, and
the first pile was driven on August 3, 1973. Both develop-
ments are now complete and inhabited, and several streets
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near the two new complexes have been rehabilitated.
Despite the simplicity of the participatory structure,
several characteristics of the process indicate that it
truly represented bona fide co-production:
1) The declaration of intents committed both sides to
rights and obligations not only about goals, but also about
the process itself. Accepting this agreement required an
enormous leap of faith for both sides. The city was in
essence admitting that it had lied when it stated that low-
rent development was impossible in Oranjeplein. The resi-
dents, on the other hand, were agreeing to sit down and
bargain in trust with an opponent whom they had fought for
more than a year.
2) As far as Payable Rents was concerned, conflict
with the city came to an end. Protests and other efforts
to embarrass city officials ceased. The organization was
responsible for attracting the largest possible number of
people to the meetings with the city -- but for the purpose
of constructive dialogue, not for a brute show of force.
Cessation of conflict was limited in two important
ways. Firstly, Payable Rents was at all times ready to
return to protest if the city reneged on its commitments.
Secondly, other groups in the area, especially a large
rival organization known as Renters' Association of
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Schilderswijk (Huurdersvereniging Schilderswijk, HVS),
continued their protests and refused to accept the notion
of co-production. In an important respect, this continued
conflict helped Payable Rents' position vis a vis the city,
because the municipality was forced to recognize the
pressure being applied to Payable Rents on its left flank.
Unless the city kept its promises and compromised on sub-
stantive planning issues, the moderate leadership of
Payable Rents could have been overthrown and the whole
process may have fallen apart.
3) Although many public meetings were held, important
decisions were made in behind-the-scenes negotiations be-
tween the city and the leaders of Payable Rents. The
organization never sent less than two representatives to
these meetings, and they were required to report back to
frequent public meetings which were held afterwards. While
we may argue about the advisability of joining the city
in "smoke-filled" rooms, there is little doubt that city
workers would try to circumvent a process which committed
them to make all decisions in public (as was precisely the
case in Renbaankwartier). The interests of the residents
of Oranjeplein seemed to be well-served by a combination of
private negotiations and frequent public meetings.
4) The residents and the city did not merely co-plan,
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but they actually co-produced. The buildings were con-
structed according to specifications determined by the
city and the citizens, and units were distributed according
to agreements which all parties reached. Although the
degree of renewal may not have pleased all members of
Payable Rents (in fact, there are still many run-down
buildings and vacant lots in Oranjeplein), there is
general satisfaction with the physical and social outcome
of the new buildings.
Schilderswijk II: Ossification and Recovery
In 1974, Payable Rents decided to expand into a new
organization which the Dutch call a stichting. The sticht-
ing is a kind of foundation which has the legal right to
receive government subsidies. It has a board of directors
which is self-regenerating, i.e. board members pick their
own successors. The members named their new organization
Residents' Organization for Oranjeplein-Schilderswijk
(Bewoners' OrganizatieOranjeplein-Schilderswijk, BOS).
With the arrival of government subsidies, BOS opened up
a permanent office and hired several staff members. The
staffers were non-professional, and most were from
Schilderswijk. However, they performed functions which
made close consultation with the residents less vital. The
leader of the group, Aad Kuypers, was particularly skilled
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as an organizer and as a housing advocate. He began,
eventually, to go to negotiating sessions with the city
alone. Meanwhile, the "residents' council" (bewoners' raad),
or primary governing body of the organization, dwindled in
number of attendants; eventually, the council stopped
meeting -- a moratorium which lasted for about two years.
BOS workers, especially Kuypers, developed closer
associations with a number of city departments. People
began to say.that Kuypers liked the new-found respect he
had acquired in City Hall; he enjoyed being able to call
up an alderman and say, "I need to see you in an hour," and
have the appointment granted.
In 1976, the organization became involved in a process
to develop a "structure sketch" (see p. 30 for an explan-
ation of this kind of plan) for the entire Schilderswijk
neighborhood. This process also arose out of conflict,
this time concerning a structure plan which municipal
planners formulated entirely without the participation of
the citizenry, sparking bitter fears that the city was
trying to reverse the gains made by Payable Rents in
Oranjeplein.
The structure plan was similar to the MAVOB proposal,
only on a much grander scale. It called for massive demoli-
tion throughout Schilderswijk, and the construction of new
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units whose rents would be far beyond the means of the
current residents. A grandiose linear park was to weave its
way through the district, and roads were to be widened to
accommodate increased traffic. The plan was geared to
serve people who lived "individuated" rather than "communal"
lives, according to one observer.8 In other words, the
neighborhood visualized by the structure plan would be
excellent for young families with few children, a car, and
most of their friends living outside of Schilderswijk. The
plan was uniquely unsuited to the needs of larger, poorer
families with close ties to other people on the block or
down the street.
For a year, the city tried to get the residents to
discuss the plan on its merits, but they refused. Finally,
the city agreed to drop the plan, and involve citizen
groups from Schilderswijk in a new process to formulate a
second structure plan.
We can isolate several major themes in the participa-
tion experience which followed this decision. Firstly,
the citizens themselves were involved in shaping the process
by which they would participate. The process which evolved
was more sophisticated than the Oranjeplein procedure, in-
volving more people and broader issues. At the same time,
however, BOS was growing further away from its constituency;
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it was becoming increasingly dependent on the talents of
one charismatic leader. The organization began to ossify,
failing to keep in touch with citizen needs and frustrations
about the time it took to translate plans into action. By
the end of my study, however, BOS had begun taking steps
to restore its legitimacy in the community.
We will now examine some of the key ways in which
the participation process for the structure plan differed
from that process that was used for the Oranjeplein
-developments:
1) A detailed survey was conducted throughout the
neighborhood by workers for the City Development Agency,
soliciting resident opinions about current conditions in
the neighborhood (housing, schools, traffic, etc.), people's
perceptions of Schilderswijk vis a vis other neighborhoods
where they might choose to move, and how people wanted
their housing circumstances to be improved (rehabilitation
versus new construction, parking availability, height of
buildings, trade-offs between amenities and post-renewal
rent levels, etc.).
The research indicated that the leaders of BOS did,
for the most part, accurately represent the views and
desires of their members, with two important exceptions
which indicate that the information channels within the
organization were not completely clear. First, the leaders
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wanted a higher rate of demolition and new construction
than did their constituents, who frequently liked their
old houses and preferred rehabilitation. Secondly, the
leaders were less concerned about parking places for
cars than the residents; in fact, residents were willing
to pay higher rents in order to have carports placed
underground.
2) The residents of Schilderswijk were directly
involved in formulating the participation process itself.
In fact, the process negotiations frequently generated as
much controversy as substantive planning issues.
The leaders of BOS and other neighborhood organ-
izations sat down with workers from the City Development
Agency to set up details of the process. HVS (BOS's left-
wing rival) wanted a more public process, with no behind-
the-scenes bargaining; BOS was less rigid in its demands,
but insisted that public meetings be held to examine all
major issues and review all major decisions.
3) They agreed on a five-step participation process,
for which they divided the neighborhood into ten districts.
The first step was to disseminate information about the
neighborhood and the structure-planning process throughout
the quarter. The second phase involved organizing district
consultation groups in all ten parts of Schilderswijk, and
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five neighborhood-wide working groups to deal with particu-
lar subjects (housing and parks, traffic, clubhouses and
recreation, shops, and schools). Essentially, membership
on these committees was open to anyone who wanted to
attend; in reality, however, most of the attendants re-
presented individual neighborhood organizations, such as
BOS, the organization with the most power in the process.
In the third phase, the neighborhood-wide working
groups (housing and parks, traffic, clubhouses and recrea-
tion, shops, and schools) conducted research and came up
with basic proposals, which were then reviewed by the ten
district consultation groups. These proposals were then
"fleshed-out" by the City Development Agency (fourth
phase).
Finally, the proposals were reviewed one final
time by the working groups and district consultation groups,
after which they were routed to the mayor, aldermen, and
Town Council for final approval. The Town Council approved
the new structure plan in January 1979 without any amend-
ments to the agreements worked out between the residents'
groups and the City Development Agency.
This process was obviously much more complicated
than the earlier process involving Payable Rents. Firstly,
plans went through several iterations, with different groups
being involved at different occasions. In addition, several
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neighborhood organizations were involved, with different
opinions about what ought to happen in Schilderswijk.
Although a coalition of groups opposing the original
structure-plan did exist, its members were far from
unanimous in their opinions on substantive planning issues.
4) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the agenda
of issues had been extended far beyond mere housing concerns.
Residents were now asked to comment on green space -- not
for two housing complexes, but for an entire neighborhood.
They were concerned not with the volume of cars on a few
streets, but traffic loads through and around all of
Schilderswijk. Recreational facilities and schools, sub-
jects which were hardly discussed in the first participation
process, nowhad working groups of their own. In the first
participation effort, there had been only one question to
settle regarding the neighborhood economy: will stores
be concentrated within the housing complexes, or will they
be moved down the street? (The latter was chosen.) Now,
however, a whole range of economic and business-location
decisions had to be considered to spur the economic re-
vitalization of Schilderswijk.
Toward the end of the first effort, observers
had noticed that certain residents (although not an over-
whelming number) were becoming more interested in issues
"larger" than just housing. The new participation process
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confirmed that interest in these issues had grown to the
point where citizen opinions could no longer be ignored.
While the four factors indicated above suggest that
the participatory process was maturing, still other events
threatened to derail the structure-plan effort, or at
least make similar participatory attempts in the future
unlikely.
Perhaps the most significant development was the
growing distance between the leaders of BOS and the resi-
dents of Schilderswijk. The residents' council had been
an integral part of Payable Rents, and BOS during its early
period. Gradually, however, people lost interest in the
regular meetings of the bewoners' raad. Meetings became
less frequent, and eventually disappeared altogether.
Once the work on the structure plan began, everyone was
busy going to other meetings -- especially the leaders and
workers of BOS.
Internal problems in BOS have always been numerous,
as can be expected for any complex citizen organization.
During the structure-planning process, one of these pro-
blems was the failure of the bewoners' raad to meet and to
serve as an effective forum for policy-making. In addition,
the organization's board of directors saw its power diminish
as Kupyers became more and more powerful. He controlled
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the hearts of many (if not most) of the organization's
members. Even more importantly, he had amassed tremendous
knowledge about urban renewal and city planning. He was
BOS's foremost spokesman and negotiator with The Hague,
and his contacts in the city bureaucracy were invaluable.
The organization could not (or thought it could not) get
along without him. His abrasive character and willingness
to negotiate agreements on his own increased complaints
about him, while his successes simultaneously increased
his control over the organization.
When one head of the board of directors resigned,
rather than face a showdown with Kuypers, a new vice-
chairwoman was appointed to take his place -- at least on
an interim basis. Her main effort (and that of her allies)
was to resurrect the bewoners' raad. Kuypers and the other
workers stiffly opposed this effort, and delayed reconven-
ing of the raad for several months. Eventually, the new
vice-chairwoman also resigned.
At the same time (and perhaps predictably), city
workers began to have doubts about BOS's representatives.
Was the organization still speaking for the residents?
The survey of the City Development Agency indicated a
general agreement between the opinions of the residents
and those of the leaders -- but there were differences
in at least a few areas: rehabilitation and parking
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(see pp. 133-34). Fortunately for BOS,this distrust among
certain city employees never surfaced in any serious way.
More important to BOS's legitimacy were increasingly
vicious attacks on its representatives and criticism of
Kuypers' strategies from left-wing forces in the neighbor-
hood, most notably HVS, disenchanted members of Payable
Rents, and certain social workers in Schilderswijk. Even
one relatively conservative community worker complained to
me that the leaders and workers of BOS were no longer
"close to the people".
In certain districts, opponents of BOS were able to
disrupt the planning process entirely for weeks at a time,
influencing people not to attend meetings and to demand that
the city do something about the immediate problems of the
neighborhood (crime, traffic, unsanitary housing conditions,
etc.), rather than all this "useless long-term planning".
The demand for immediate remedial action as a substi-
tute for endless months of planning struck a sympathetic
chord throughout the community, highlighting a key fact
which BOS's leaders had begun to forget. In their excite-
ment about the structure plan, they forgot that it was
only a plan. Plans, after all, are only as good as the
city's word and the money which is allocated to back it up.
The people of Schilderswijk were tiring of plans.
They remembered old promises which the city had made at the
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time of the original process for the Oranjeplein, promises
of concrete action to fix leaky roofs, to put new buildings
up in vacant lots where old residences had been demolished,
to make the streets safer for children. Then, without
realizing these promises, the city had come right back with
a secretly-produced structure plan which required a major
return to the conflict of the past. Many residents -- even
long-term supporters of Kuypers -- began to ask why they
should return so readily to the bargaining table before the
city made good on some of its old promises.
In some cases, BOS could no longer stem the course of
conflict, even during the participation process. When
people got tired of vacant buildings standing next to their
own homes, they would burn the buildings down; arson as a
form of protest is Schilderswijk's worst-kept secret. When
people tired of their own unsatisfactory quarters, they
squatted in more desirable, but vacant buildings -- some of
which were scheduled for demolition as part of plans BOS
had been instrumental in formulating. When the city failed
to respond to complaints about street safety, the social
workers sometimes led people out into the streets to tear
out the cobblestones, making the roads impassable. Actions
such as these were particularly serious in light of the
mild forms of protest which had characterized Schilderswijk
up until that time. The serious confrontations which were
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now occurring were quite out of tune with Dutch traditions,
and indicated the depth of people's anger. Each action
of protest embarrassed BOS and its process of participation.
I contend that the troubles plaguing the structure-
planning process were manifestations of ossification in BOS.
I have chosen the word ossification deliberately. Its
meaning is: "a tendency toward a state of being molded into
a rigid, conventional, sterile, or unimaginative condition".9
This word accurately describes what was happening to BOS
as it embarked on a process which, on the surface at least,
was far more sophisticated than the process for Oranjeplein
which had preceded it. An unwillingness to concentrate on
the immediate needs of the residents, the loss of legitimacy
which flowed from the disbanding of the residents' council,
increasing domination by one man (albeit a talented and
dedicated man) -- these factors created an organization
which was increasingly rigid and authoritarian, unable to
meet attacks on its legitimacy from the left, and in many
important respects, increasingly deaf to the complaints from
the neighborhood it was trying to serve.
Fortunately, BOS and its leaders (including Kuypers)
had invested too much time and effort -- and learned too
much about the danger signals of organizational decay --
to allow ossification to continue indefinitely. They re-
cognized that the structure-planning process was essentially
sound; they were firmly committed to the future of Schil-
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derswijk, and the people remembered that their successes
in negotiation with the city were not inconsiderable.
At the time I left The Netherlands in January 1980,
there were distinct signs that BOS was beginning to rebuild
its legitimacy and strengthen its bargaining position with
with city. Kuypers had agreed to the reinstitution of the
bewoners' raad, which has met several times since the
summer of 1979. A new chairman of the raad has been ap-
pointed.
Kuypers justifies his delay in reconvening the bewoners'
raad on two grounds. Firstly, he claims that the consulta-
tion groups involved in the structure-planning process
served the same purpose as the raad; as long as the proce-
dure continued, these groups provided contact between the
leaders and members of BOS. In addition, the structure plan
was so time-consuming and important that it had to take
precedence over activities such as those of the residents'
council. Kuypers admitted, however, that an organization
like BOS must avoid assigning itself too many tasks --
lest it begin to lose contact with its own members. There-
fore (in the future at least), the workers and board of BOS
will carefully choose which projects the organization will
work on. Kuypers never admitted to any internal problems
during the structure-planning process; but his statements
appear to imply a recognition of the fact that the process
10
came close to over-loading his organization.
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In addition, the organization has begun to re-emphasize
small, street-level meetings to discuss neighborhood
problems -- one of its initial organizing methods. One such
effort, on the Nooldwijkstraat and the Falckstraat, involves
intensive conversation with about eighty families to deter-
mine their current problems and desires for the future. A
number of people who were skeptical of BOS's recent acti-
vities cited this as a very positive step.
Finally, the city made certain efforts which have
helped defuse a potentially explosive situation in Schilders-
wijk. By appointing a special committee to deal with im-
mediate problems of the residents rather than just plan for
the long-term, some of the inhabitants' most pressing
problems may be solved. The structure plan itself, which
could easily have been a very general plan with few time
limitations, states rather explicitly the steps to be
taken in each district and by what dates, presenting short-
term actions as well as long-term plans.
The plan differs from the original one in several
important respects. Displacement is not encouraged in this
plan. Massive demolition has been replaced by selective
demolition; for example, the old plan recommended that all
houses in the central district of Schilderswijk be torn
down, while the new plan calls for the destruction of only
two-thirds of these units. City traffic will be routed
-144-
around (instead of through) the neighborhood. Finally, the
linear park has been replaced by a series of smaller parks
scattered throughout the neighborhood, and more suited to
the recreational needs of children.
The planning process has now shifted from the general
structure plan for the neighborhood to specific building
plans for blocks and individual housing complexes. If the
momentum toward real renewal can be maintained, the process
of participation in Schilderswijk may well be rejuvenated.
If it cannot, however, many of the gains which have been
accomplished at great expense during the past decade could
be lost.
The city, and BOS, must remember that when the people
tired of conflict, they turned to participation as an alter-
native. Now, many people in the neighborhood are tiring of
participation, dropping out of the process, certain that
"nothing they do can make a difference". An effort to turn
this feeling around with concrete developments is BOS's
greatest current challenge.
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CHAPTER IV
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PARTICIPATION IN THE HAGUE
Reviewing the Evaluation Criteria
In Chapter II, I presented a set of five criteria which
could be used to assess the effectiveness of citizen partici-
pation. Some of the criteria were divided into subsections.
To refresh the reader's memory, the criteria are presented
below:
1. diffusion of conflict
a. between citizens and the municipality
b. within the neighborhood itself
2. recognition of the residents' goals for the
neighborhood
a. a meaningful planning role for community residents
b. implementing the goals of community residents
3. strengthened organizational structure of the
community
4. democratization of community institutions
5. community-wide learning
a. leadership cadre
b. average residents
c. disadvantaged
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Table III explains how each of the participatory exper-
iences presented in the last chapter fared in relation to
the criteria presented above (see the next four pages for
Table III).
We will now review Table III to analyze the findings
for each of our five criteria. In each case, I will examine
the possibility of causal links between the participatory
effort and the end result. I will also discuss the role
which various antecedent conditions may have played in
determining the outcomes. If any particular participatory
techniques seemed to correlate with effectiveness in relation
to any of the criteria, I will explain that situation as well.
1) Diffusion of conflict. For the most part, partici-
patory efforts were accompanied by reductions in the level of
conflict within the community, and between the community and
the municipality. Both forms of conflict declined as diver-
gent community elements jointly focused their attention on
co-production efforts with the municipality. There were two
major exceptions: in Renbaankwartier, open forms of conflict
(e.g., sit-ins and demonstrations) ceased, but subtle con-
frontation politicking continued in full force. During the
second effort in Schilderswijk, conflict within the community
reasserted itself as BOS suffered from increasingly severe
legitimacy problems.
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TABLE III: EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA FOR FIVE PARTICIPATORY
EXPERIENCES IN THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS
Participatory
Experience
--------------------------- Diffusion
Between Citizens and Municipality
of Conflict -------------------------------
I Within the Neighborhood Itself
Renbaankwartier/ no; participation only masked neighborhood appeared united during
Scheveningen continued conflict brief participatory effort
Schipperskwartier yes; actual conflict declined disagreements between opbouwwerkers
substantially and residents remained muted
Molenwijk yes; actual conflict declined participants appeared united; tension
substantially remained between Dutch residents and
immigrants
Schilderswijk I: yes; temporarily at least most conflict diffused; minor
Oranjeplein attacks continued from the left
Schilderswijk II: yes; but less completely than in conflict heated up as BOS came under
Structure Plan Schilderswijk I due to attacks on attack from the left, and from ideo-
municipality from groups other than logical neutrals who wanted greater
Bewoners' Organizatie Oranjeplein- democratization and more attention to
Schilderswijk (BOS) immediate problems of residents
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TABLE III (cont.): EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA FOR FIVE PARTICIPATORY
EXPERIENCES IN THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS
Participatory
Experience
2
------------ Recognition of Residents' Goals for
Meaningful Planning Role for
Community Residents
the Neighborhood ------------------
Implementing the Goals
of Community Residents
Renbaankwartier/ partial role; participation process displacement largely halted; pro-
Scheveningen was too brief and too simple to in- resident agreements reached on
volve residents deeply in planning most major issues; neighborhood to
process remain essentially as it is
Schipperskwartier strong role created for opbouwwerkers; plans now being implemented; sig-
weak role for average residents nificant new construction, but
probably less rehabilitation than
residents desire
Molenwijk meaningful role created, but mainly plars now being implemented will
for people who are soon to leave lead to gentrification and signif-
neighborhood icant displacement, corresponding
to desires of most residents, but
harmful to large minority
Schilderswijk I: meaningful role created for both new apartments built for current
Oranjeplein leaders and residents; impact for residents; plan included some amen-
community ensured through "dec- ities, economic development, and
laration of intents" rehabilitation of nearby buildings
Schilderswijk II:
Structure Plan
role for leaders became more elab-
orate; many residents remained
involved, but others lost contact
with BOS
plan has been approved but not yet
implemented; most aspects correspond
to community desires; significant
improvement over original plan pre-
pared without participation
------------ JL_
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TABLE III (cont.): EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA FOR FIVE PARTICIPATORY
EXPERIENCES IN THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS
Participatory
Experience
3
Strengthened
Organizational Structure
4
Democratization of
Community Institutions
Renbaankwartier/ yes; Bewoners' Beraad some involvement of residents on BBR
Scheveningen Renbaankwartier (BBR) became working committees and in public
strong force in the community meetings; structure remained essen-
tially authoritarian
Schipperskwartier yes; Actiegroep Vergetendorp only on paper; opbouwwerkers control
became powerful and respected flow of information and decision-making
in community and at City Hall process
Molenwijk yes; but much of this will be some democratization; noteworthy
lost if present community leaves efforts to include women and children;
unsuccessful attempts to include
immigrants
Schilderswijk I: yes; neighborhood organizations yes; roles of average residents
Oranjeplein became stronger, more knowledge- expanded; BOS established residents'
able, and far more capable at council and daily board of directors
defending their interests to link leaders with members
Schilderswijk II: at first, position of BOS in roles of residents no longer expanding;
Structure Plan community erodes; attacks from evidence of authoritarian rigidity and
left and reduced credibility at weakening of democratic procedures;
City Hall; then, evidence of then, evidence of mild recovery
mild recovery
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TABLE III (cont.): EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA FOR FIVE PARTICIPATORY
EXPERIENCES IN THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS
Participatory
Experience
5
----------------------- Community-Wide Learning
Leadership Cadre lAverage Residents Disadvantaged
Renbaankwartier/ yes; but cadre is only among selected none observed
Scheveningen fairly small individuals
Schipperskwartier yes; especially among little observed; none observed
opbouwwerkers probably quite low
Molenwijk yes; Actiegroep some; extent uncertain efforts made to
Laakkwartier employs include immigrants
Planwinkel for technical meet with low rate
assistance of success
Schilderswijk I: yes; substantial increase yes; evidence of expanded little to none
Oranjeplein in knowledge and sophisti- knowledge of and concern
cation of cadre in dealing about broader neighbor-
with city hood issues
Schilderswijk II: maybe; level of increase some increase; varied among little to none; only
Structure Plan over previous gains not districts depending on minor success of
clear composition of groups, efforts to involve
levels of attendance, immigrants
division into small groups,
etc.
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In most cases, the reduction in or elimination of
conflict was directly tied to the participatory process. In
several cases, in fact, conflict between the people and the
municipality centered more heavily on the demand for partici-
pation than it did on the substantive renewal issues under
consideration. Therefore, it was only logical that the be-
ginning of a participatory process should see some reduction
in the level of conflict, especially if representatives of
the community had been involved in designing the process.
In all cases, however, community organizations left
open the possibility of a return to conflict. The only case
where this can be disputed is Schilderswijk II, where BOS
because so heavily invested in the ethic of participation
(which places the burden of quiescence on participating
organizations), that the city (at least temporarily) came
to expect a negotiating partner which would be reliably
docile in the neighbrohood, if still fiesty at the bargain-
ing table. BOS's eventual move away from this stance re-
sulted largely from conflict within its own ranks, its
leaders' recognition that participation was not "all things
to all people" (i.e. participation could not completely
substitute for political action), and pressure on BOS's
left flank.
The "open door" policy with regard to conflict
(ranging from Renbaankwartier where the door was left wide
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open, to Schilderswijk II where the door was left barely ajar)
was critically important to the success of the participation
process, at least from the residents' point of view. City
politicians who gave orders to the negotiating agencies were
very nervous about the potential impact of further conflict
on the next elections. The Hague government is a delicately
balanced coalition of Labour (socialist), Christian Demo-
cratic (centrist), and 'Liberal (conservative, sic) town
councillors (see pp. 14-16 and 46-47 for an explanation of the
Dutch parties). The Christian Democrats and Liberals were
not eager to see the left gain the upper hand, as it had in
Rotterdam and Amsterdam, which The Hague views as its "less
stable" sister cities. This fear of the adverse political
results of conflict applied particularly to Schipperskwartier
and Schilderswijk, where the action groups were powerful
and very well-organized. In Renbaankwartier, the Town
Council allied itself with the residents' group to force the
mayor and aldermen to make a separate plan for the quarter,
involving citizen participation.
Within the city bureaucracy, the view toward partici-
pation was by no means uniform. Although younger planners
tended to see the need for participation (some actually have
made their reputations by skillfully dealing with participa-
tion efforts), the older planners and city bureaucrats were
vehemently opposed to the notion of citizens (mere planning
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amateurs) questioning their professional judgment. When
the professionals working for the city were at odds on this
matter, the potential threat of resurgent conflict was one
of the strongest arguments younger planners could use to
bring other bureaucrats into line and continue support of the
participatory efforts during times of stress.
City workers involved in the participation efforts
in The Hague faced no greater challenge than breaking through
the endless red tape and bureaucratic delay which character-
ize Dutch municipal government. Citizens expected a little
more progress every day. If they asked a question on Tuesday
they wanted an answer on Wednesday. If a building was demo-
lished, plans had to be ready to begin new construction on
that site immediately.
Holland, unfortunately, is a quintessentially bureau-
cratic state. Every decision must pass through a maze of
committees and approvers before it becomes reality. Nothing,
however, is more likely to prompt a return to conflict than
bureaucratic delay; it is prime fuel for citizens' insecurity
about entering into a participation process with "the enemy".
Delay, generally, is interpreted as deception.
In many cases, the City Development Agency and other
departments of the municipality had to develop special tech-
niques to deal with this problem. These techniques included
the assignment of specific contact persons in the City
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Development Agency and various resident groups to act a
trouble-shooters if the process hit a snag. In the case of
the Schilderswijk structure planning process, the agreed-
upon procedures provided for a special "signal team" to
be called into action if negotiations broke down on any
particular issue; the signal team was never used.
An important, if informal, agreement between the
City Development Agency and various citizen groups involved
in participatory efforts was the strict adherence to dead-
lines -- for both sides -- in order to engender trust, and
give the proceedings an air of professionalism. In addition,
the city developed a strict policy of never promising more
than it could deliver to avoid raising expectations so high
as to risk disappointment later. Through mechanisms such
as these, the city and the participating communities sought
to ensure smooth bargaining and minimize the chance of a
return to conflict. Perhaps one of the most important
precedents was set by Alderman Nuy during the Schilderswijk
Oranjeplein process, when he gave his on-the-spot negotia-
tors wide discretion to make promises and act on their
commitments, rather than having to report back to City
Hall for permission on every small point.
(In the even more complicated maze of Amsterdam's
administration, one of the most serious problems facing the
"project group" participation efforts was the question of
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whether or not middle-management negotiators could speak for
their departments, and even communicate officially with the
representatives of other agencies before receiving permission
from their bosses. Eventually, they received this authority,
but only after bureaucratic delays almost derailed the exper-
imental project group procedures.)
Although techniques such as those discussed above can
certainly help diffuse conflict (and keep it from returning),
conditions antecedent to the beginning of participation are
also critical. The attitudes of city workers and neighborhood
leaders seemed particularly important in the cases which I
studied.
In Schilderswijk, city workers and citizen activists
initially approached each other with grave misgivings. A
working relationship quickly developed, however, largely due
to the respect which the city workers accorded to the leader
of Payable Rents, Aad Kuypers. Kuypers and his associates
developed a reputation for keeping the process on track, being
direct but reliable, and willing to bargain behind closed
doors when necessary.
In Renbaankwartier, the same level of respect did not
develop. On the one hand, leaders of Bewoners' Beraad
Renbaankwartier did not share the Kuypers philosophy of
participation. They believed that conflict was their best
weapon, and they were unwilling to lay it aside. They had
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little respect for the city workers. The city, for its part,
immediately tried to redefine the boundaries of the
Renbaankwartier planning district at the start of the pro-
cess. They responded to the public character of the meetings
with statements which the group considered downright dis-
honest. Above all, the city executive resented the fact that
the Town Council had foisted the participation process on
them. In short, conditions for mutual respect were poor.
2) Recognition of the residents' goals for the neigh-
borhood. Ideally, a participatory process should legitimize
residents' goals for their neighborhood by providing them
with a meaningful role in the planning process. In most of
the cases I studied in The Hague, a meaningful role was
achieved -- but the credit seemed to go to the protests which
preceded participation, rather than to the processes adopted
themselves. In some instances, however, particular tech-
niques deserve special note for enlarging the roles of
residents and allowing for a more precise articulation of
desires.
In Schilderswijk, three such techniques stand out.
The first is the in-depth survey of resident attitudes which
the City Development Agency conducted prior to the structure-
planning process. An enormously comprehensive survey, this
research provided planners with detailed information about
the feelings of Schilderswijkers -- most importantly those
-158-
who were not vocal enough to actually participate in the
more public aspects of the process. The second tech-
nique involved the division of the neighborhood into ten
small districts, each with its own consultation group to
handle the unique problems and concerns of that district.
Thirdly, the process expanded participation beyond the realm
of housing, the subject area which was the sole focus of
most participatory procedures in cities throughout Holland.
By involving working groups on schools, recreation, traffic,
and businesses, the process ensured that resident views would
be heard on a broad range of issues.
Similarly innovative techniques for capturing the
essence of resident opinions have been used in Molenwijk,
although they are less valuable in light of the fact that
most of the residents will be moving away as renewal proceeds.
Nonetheless, efforts to involve immigrants (such as simul-
taneous translation, assignment of a special social worker,
and multi-lingual documentation) are worthy of note. The
projects involving children in the neighborhood's renewal are
are surely worth the time and effort, even though the outcome
of this program is not yet known.
I would not go so far as to draw direct causal links
between techniques such as these and the degree to which the
process has given legitimacy to the residents' goals for
their neighborhood. I do believe such techniques make the
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planning role of residents more meaningful and enable them
to articulate their desires more precisely.
Above and beyond the processes themselves, however,
what have the residents actually accomplished? The key
political issue at stake in the struggles over participation
revolved around the displacement of current residents which
the city was recommending (explicitly or implicitly) in
most of its plans. In Scheveningen, residents were to be
removed for the promotion of the tourist trade -- allegedly
an economic necessity for The Hague; this argument, however,
could not justify the luxury apartment houses and office
buildings which were also being planned for the neighborhood.
In Schipperskwartier, office buildings and a widened road
were to replace housing in much of the district. In
Schilderswijk, luxury apartments, office buildings, widened
roads, and major parks were planned. -
In cases where new housing was proposed, there would
be far fewer units and far higher rents after renewal. De-
spite the government's official relocation policy (which the
residents of Molewnijk depended upon so heavily), the most dis-
advantaged and politically weak residents of the other quarters
feared there would not be enough housing for them in other
parts of the city. They worried that they might be paying
far higher rents in their new homes. They did not want to
lose the familiar faces and streets they had lived with for
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so long; and they feared being moved into some of the sterile,
cardboard-construction neighborhoods which had recently been
build as repositories for "undesirables" being moved away
from the city's core, which was now to be put to "more
economic use".
The single greatest achievement of the residents'
struggles, therefore, has been a series of commitments from
the municipality to abandon their relocation schemes, and
plan renewal of the old quarters for the current residents,
and not for newcomers. The single major exception to this
rule is Molenwijk, where the new neighborhood will probably
house a substantially wealthier population than currently
resides there.
In addition, there have been some compromises on the
part of the citizens. Although most of Renbaankwartier is
safe, the city has still not given a firm commitment to
prevent future demolition of housing; and luxury apartments
are still sprouting like mushrooms all around the borders
of the quarter, increasing the economic pressue for develop-
ment in Renbaankwartier itself. In Schipperskwartier,
Actiegroep Vergetendorp was forced to accept a slightly
larger percentage of apartments for new families who are
expected to move into the quarter from the outside, plus
a few office buildings. On the whole, however, the quarters
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have been preserved for their current residents, at afford-
able rents.
Was the participation responsible for this commit-
ment, however? The answer seems to be: partly, but not
entirely. The initial commitment flowed from the conflict
which in all cases was a necessary precedent to participa-
tion; without conflict, the city would certainly not have
changed its plans. However, participation gave the commit-
ment detail, and ensured its duration. Backsliding from the
commitment on the part of the city became significantly more
difficult when city workers had to attend meetings with
citizens several times a week. In addition, the participa-
tory process allowed citizens to influence the precise ways
in which the commitment would be carried out.
In most cases, the planning process-involving par-
ticipation led to actual physical improvement of the neigh-
borhood. Designers may argue about the quality of the new
housing, the mix of rehabilitation versus new construction,
the traffic patterns, and the green space; but there is
little doubt that the residents believe their neighborhoods
have been improved physically.
As usual, there are some exceptions. In the
Renbaankwartier section of Scheveningen, the residents were
more concerned with preserving the physical structure of
their neighborhood-, rather than altering it -- and they
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achieved this goal. In Schipperskwartier, the quality of
the new construction which is beginning to flow from the new
plans may be below the standard which the residents want;
that is uncertain, however. In Schilderswijk II, the
structure plan has not yet produced physical improvement,
although building plans are already being produced and
implementation appears imminent in certain districts.
Improvement of the social environment was considerably
less evident than physical improvement in the neighborhoods
I studied. This event was not surprising, for several
reasons, the most important of which was that the city
and the action groups tended to concentrate on physical
problems almost exclusively. Several people with whom I
spoke in the neighborhoods lamented the lack of attention
to social issues, particularly education, crime (especially
vandalism and arson), and relations between Dutchmen and
minorities. It is understandable, however, that these prob-
lems received less attention since they are less easy to solve.
Participation processes have a very low tolerance
for failure. A lack of swift, concrete results, can easily
derail a process. Physical successes, although difficult to
obtain, are far more easily attained than improvements in
social milieu.
Another factor in the downplaying of-social issues is
the idea (well-tested and proven in Holland) that successful
-163-
participation depends on stressing "doorstep issues" and
"making the process of renewal 'real' to the people".
(Zeisel and Godschalk discuss this extensively in their por-
tion of the report of the German Marshall Fund project team).
It is argued that physical issues (especially housing and
traffic) are "closest" to the people and most easily under-
stood.
I agree with the idea that participation is more
likely to succeed if the issues considered are readily
understandable and part of people's immediate concerns.
A failure to deal with immediate problems almost derailed
the second Schilderswijk effort. However, I think this
argument is faulty when applied to the question of including
social issues in the participation planning process. The
people I interviewed were deeply concerned about education,
crime, and race relations -- and eager to seek solutions.
The city agencies, however, are dominated by physical
planners who are not usually comfortable with these ques-
tions; and many of the citizen activists are also architects,
or residents who have developed expertise in dealing with
the physical environment. This bias, as well as the desire
for relatively quick successes, may be the reason why social
issues received a low priority in the planning process.
3) Strengthened organizational structure of the com-
munity. Generally, the cases I studied involved a
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strengthening of the organizational structure of the neigh-
borhood. New action groups were formed, coalitions (however
tenuous) were created, and old groups grew stronger (or were
replaced by stronger successors). A powerful leadership
cadre regularly emerged to represent the interests of commu-
nities which had been previously under-represented on the
municipal level. The politicization of the population in-
creased the attention city politicians paid to these neigh-
borhoods, and in some cases, indigenous organizers emerged
to run for public office on the city level (although this
created loyalty conflicts which occasionally alienated these
leaders from their natural constituencies).
However, most of these results can be traced to the
stage of conflict, rather than the period of participation.
Conflict, if it is to be successful, demands strong organiza-
tion. Participation, on the other hand, can induce a soft-
ening in community power institutions, as witnessed most
noticeably in BOS during the second phase of participation in
Schilderswijk.
Furthermore, much of the strengthening which did occur
seemed to be largely centered in particular groups, with
questionable spin-off effects through the rest of the communi-
ties. I could find no techniques which seemed to induce
(or which were even highly correlated with) a strengthening
of community institutions beyond the level which existed at
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the time the participatory processes began. It is the period
of conflict which must take primary credit for the signifi-
cant amount of institutional development which occurred in
the neighborhoods I studied.
4) Democratization of community institutions. Only lim-
ited democratization occurred in the cases I studied in The
Hague. More frequently militant elites or charismatic leaders
came to dominate the process of participation. In the case,
of Schilderswijk, group leaders still seemed able to-repre-
sent neighborhood views accurately on most issues; in
Schipperskwartier, representativeness is in greater doubt.
A lack of democratic operating principles is not
without cost. The single greatest cost is the risk that
group leaders will not accurately represent the views of
residents, leading to renewal which the inhabitants may not
find suitable -- an event which could lead to conflict in
the future. There are also other costs. An excessive
dependence on individual leaders can negatively affect the
learning process. If residents are not regularly involved
in the process of participation (and in the supervision of
their leaders' actions), they are unlikely to pick up any of
the skills listed on p. 79. There is little reason to believe
that these skills are being picked up by the residents of
Renbaankwartier or Schipperskwartier.
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In addition, the failure to democratize a participat-
ing organization can have negative repercussions within the
leadership cadre itself. In Schilderswijk, the conflict over
the bewoners' raad split the leadership, forcing one activve
member to remove herself from the organization; an outside
advisor to the group is also planning to leave soon, partly
because of this controversy. In short, a hierarchical, au-
thoritarian style of operation can deprive an action group
of allies and members who might otherwise contribute to
the effort.
City officials are often anxious to have community
institutions democratize their operations, in order to fend
off attacks from the opponents of participation who claim
that militant activists "are terrorizing" community residents
into protesting against their elected officials. On the
other hand, political pressures often prevent city govern-
ments from pressing for democratization. Hierarchical
neighborhood organizations which are capable of disciplining
their members and "delivering the goods" are often much more
useful to a city government, at least in the short term, than
pluralistic action groups which have trouble making up their
minds.
Our cases in The Hague give us a bleak outlook on the
role of participation in democratizing neighborhood institu-
tions. There are some bright spots, however. Although BBR
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in Renbaankwartier is still under the control of a militant
elite, citizens play important roles on the organization's
working committees, and they are frequently called upon to
attend meetings with the city (which are always public) where
they can influence proceedings by their very numbers.
In Molenwijk, some attempts have been made to include
in the process groups which have been largely ignored in the
past, specifically women, immigrants, and children. Although
success in this endeavor has been mixed, the attempt is at
least a step toward democratizing the participatory process
in that neighborhood -- although it gives us no assurance
that Actiegroep Laakkwartier is run in a democratic fashion.
In Schilderswijk, Payable Rents tried very hard
during its early stages to develop a democratic institution.
It created a residents' council and a "daily board of direc-
tors" (dag-bestuur) as part of this effort; regular meetings
with the community were held, and BOS organizers worked on
the street and block level.
In all three neighborhoods discussed above, democrati-
zation was correlated with the arrival of participation. In
each case, the efforts made to increase the democratic nature
of the action group related to the group's need to prove its
own representativeness, and its need to delegate the complex
and time-consuming tasks of participation. Little democrati-
zation was observable during the period of open conflict.
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Participation can also lead to organizational rig-
idity, however, and a trend away from democratic values, as
proven in the Schilderswijk structure-planning process, where
the leaders of the organization became so wrapped up in the
process itself that democratization took a back seat (although
efforts are now underway to reverse this situation).
As a final note, we should point out that the trend
toward (or away from) neighborhood democracy was dependent
upon factors external to the participation process, most
notably the level of conflict remaining in the community
(which tended to work against democratization) and the
attitudes of the group leaders (who frequently considered
democracy a waste of time and effort).
5) Community-wide learning. On the whole, skills pos-
sessed by the leaders increased markedly in the communities
studied in most skill categories listed on p. 79. People
with natural organizing and planning talents emerged rapidly,
and set up positions of dominance in the community. For
example, Schilderswijk, which has now gone through two phases
of conflict and participation, has developed an especially
sophisticated leadership cadre. Laborers with no more than
a primary-school education have risen to positions of great
power in their communities, based not merely on the strength
of their personalities (although this has play a role), but
also on the basis of real knowledge and skills.
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It is equally important, however, to analyze learning
among those members of the Dutch working-class who did not
rise to positions of leadership. Generally, the average
citizen who attended a number of meetings and offered opin-
ions about the future of his/her block and street has learned
a good deal about setting priorities, the economics of
planning, and planning procedures. Increased organizational
abilities and deeper understandings of political realities
are not so strongly evidenced, however. If they were willing
to put in some time and buy into the process, they would come
away with greater knowledge which might help them defend
their own personal interests better in the future.
This phenomenon was generally observable in most of
the neighborhoods I studied, although different processes
used different techniques to induce greater learning among
average citizens. In Renbaankwartier, all meetings with
the city had to be public -- a fact which may have had ad-
verse political implications, but which gave many residents
an opportunity to learn about the planning process.
In Molenwijk, the consultant firm Planwinkel insti-
tuted a series of' efforts to induce learning among the com-
munity's average residents, including contacts with children
and special monthly meetings at which thorny planning issues
were dissected.
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BOS in Schilderswijk hired part-time (sometimes
volunteer) experts from inside and outside the community to
provide technical information and help with drawing up re-
sponses to city proposals; BOS members and workers learned
much from these outside experts. The working groups insti-
tuted in the structure-planning process also enabled citizens
to learn about subject areas other than housing (such as
schools, economic development, and traffic).
On the whole, however, these techniques were not very
useful in involving the disadvantaged members of the commu-
nity in the participation process. The elderly, handicapped,
and immiqrant members of the community were not, on the
whole, deeply involved. These groups are prevented from
participating in at least three ways. Firstly, they are less
able to involve themselves due to infirmity, a lack of skills,
or an inability to articulate their desires in Dutch. Sec-
ondly, (especially in the case of minorities), the dominant
participants are not eager to see them involved, and make
few efforts (if any) to encourage them to overcome their
participatory disadvantages. Finally, these groups lack
natural leaders and spokespersons who can bring them into
the process, or at least represent their interests.
As with the other criteria we have examined, the role
of antecedent conditions cannot be discounted. Although cer-
tain techniques seemed linked with a high level of learning,
-171-
an impetus was required to put these techniques into effect
in the first place. This makes the role of community
leadership particularly critical. In the case of Schippers-
kwartier and Renbaankwartier, for example, the leadership was
not apparently interested in encouraging learning within the
community, and has installed few techniques to do so.
Finally, I would like to comment on the notion of
single- and double-loop learning discussed in Chapter II.
Single-loop learning was evident in all the neighborhoods,
since the leaders and/or the residents obviously learned
quite a bit about particular planning issues and strategies
for dealing with the city.
Double-loop learning, on the other hand, was more
difficult to detect. BBR in Renbaankwartier seemed to
change its philosophy about the world when it broke away
from WOS and pursued its own pattern of militant conflict
with the municipality. It would not change its theories
a second time, however, to engage more earnestly in partici-
pation.
BOS in Schilderswijk did change to a participatory
philosophy when it shifted from the conflict-mode to the
cooperation-mode. The BOS and BBR examples would seem to in-
dicate that neighborhood leaders are critical in determining
whether or not double-loop learning can occur within an organ-
ization. If they are resistant to change and strongly
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convinced of the rightness of their own assumptions, the
chances are bleak. On the other hand, leaders who are
willing to have their own positions challenged are more
likely to learn in a double-loop fashion, and although
organizations do not necessarily learn everything their
leaders do, the chances for group learning are improved
when leaders themselves learn.
The Primacy of Attitudes, Conflict, and Leadership
Practicing planners, and academic researghers who try to
improve planning practice, seem ever to be involved in a
search for the correct mix of "participation techniques"
which will ensure "effective participation" (or at least
promote it with a reasonable frequency of success).
My research in The Hague, and briefer visits to Amster-
dam, Groningen, Nijmegen, Rotterdam, and Utrecht, have
convinved me that conditions antecedent to the beginning
of a participation process have much more to do with its
likelihood for success than the actual format of the process.
Specificially, I would identify three key antecedent
conditions: a) the attitudes of city workers and citizen
participants toward each other; b) the level and form of
conflict preceding the participation (and chances for the
re-emergence of conflict during or after the participation
process); and c) the presence, strength, and opinions of an
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indigenous neighborhood leadership. In the preceding
section on effectiveness criteria I have tried to indicate
the importance of these conditions in all five cases I
studied in The Hague. In the next few pages, I would like
to explore these conditions citing the Hague examples, as
well as others I explored more briefly in The Netherlands.
1) Attitudes. The history of planning practice in
Holland, as in the United States, makes participation an
unnatural form of behavior. Planning professionals and
politicians usually see conflict mediated through the
electoral process, or through standardized, although
informal, political mechanisms of reward and punishment.
The idea of having all parties to a dispute sit down at a
table to plan the future is a new and frightening phenomenon
to many associated with municipal government.
Similarly, citizens are not used to the process,
or to the very idea of bargaining for neighborhood renewal.
Naturally, they enter the process with trepidation and mis-
trust.
As they begin participation, both sides will make
mistakes which hurt their negotiating counter-parts. The
level of respect and trust which the parties bear for each
other will directly affect their ability to overlook
problems early on, and proceed with the process. The
Schilderswijk and Renbaankwartier cases in The Hague are
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opposite examples of how the attitudes of citizens and city
workers can affect a participatory process (see pp. 156-57
for a comparison of these two cases).
The city of Groningen, in the northern part of the
country, was in many ways Holland's laboratory for partici-
pation, largely because of the efforts of Max van den Berg,
the alderman in charge of urban renewal. A member of the
socialist Labor party (and currently national party head),
van den Berg believed that participation was the best way
to ensure that neighborhoods were renewed without displacing
the present residents. He and his associates spent several
years encouraging action groups to form throughout Groningen,
followed by efforts to actually plan renewal efforts in
accordance with citizen desires. Although van den Berg did
not have a completely smooth relationship with the groups
he helped create, his own personal commitment to participa-
tion laid a firm groundwork for an atmosphere of trust and
cooperation.
Nijmegen, a staunchly Catholic and conservative city
on the German border, provides a counterpoint to the
Groningen experience. City officials long sought to
undermine organizing efforts, and repeatedly supported plans
which displaced residents (or threatened to do so). For
years, they refused to recognize action groups as legitimately
representative. A recently adopted code to govern future
participation in Nijmegen is viewed with distrust by many
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residents of the neighborhoods who believe it will do nothing
more than co-opt their interests. A number of action groups
fear that the city will try to cut their budgets now that
the bulk of social service funding has been decentralized
from the national government to local municipalities (see
pp. 41-43).
On the whole, citizen participation in Nijmegen
has not accomplished very much at all, except in certain
neighborhoods where militant conflict must take primary
credit for victories by the residents. The process of
participation today is not very much smoother in Nijmegen
than it was several years ago, largely because the critical
base of trust has not formed.
2) Conflict. The typical American typology of citizen
participation techniques (most notably Sherry Arnstein's
"ladder of citizen participation") describes participation
according to a series of possible power relationships
between the city and the residents. The greater the real
power of the residents, the higher the form of citizen
participation.
These systems, although they provide accurate
snapshots of various stages of participation, have always
been rather unsatisfying to researchers who recognized that
the evolution of citizen participation does not flow evenly
up the ladder. The stages do not necessarily follow each
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other in a logical order, and the various ladders which have
been proposed tell us little about the evolution of parti-
cipation.
Professor Hugo Priemus of the Delft Technical
University has concluded substantial research on citizen
participation in The Netherlands, with particular attention
paid to Crosswijk in Rotterdam, one of the neighborhoods
discussed in the paper by Zeisel and Godschalk. Priemus has
advanced an historical explanation of the participation
process, in five stages:
Stage 1: No role for citizens in the renewal
process.
Stage II: Protest and conflict.
Stage III: Informal role established for
citizens (or certain citizens).
Stage IV: Creation of a formal structure
(usually considered a victory by
citizens).
Stage V: Recognition of the inadequacy of
formal structures for participation.
Priemus explains that Dutch groups
have not developed a coordinated
strategy for dealing with Stage V
yet, although some are beginning
to recognize that formal structures
often work against their interests.
Like any model, this one is far from perfect, and
several Dutch scholars have criticized it. In my opinion,
however, it makes two significant contributions to our
understanding of the dynamics of citizen participation.
First, it recognizes the integral role of conflict as an
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antecedent condition for meaningful participation. Parti-
cipatory schemes may be set up in the absence of conflict,
but they are rarely meaningful and genuine processes in
which citizens receive and exercise real power. Before the
municipality is willing to share power, it must be made to
see the price of retaining all power to itself.
Each case I studied in Holland involved concerted
conflict between citizen groups and the municipality. Only
Groningen provided an example of effective participation
which was set up without twisting the arms of those in power.
And even in that city, Max van den Berg ran into conflict
from forces within city government which did not approve of
his reforms; and once the new citizen action groups were
organized and recognized their interests, conflicts between
the groups and the city ensued on many fronts. Van den Berg
may well have wondered why he created a monster in his own
house.
Amsterdam has probably recorded the bitterest
conflicts over urban renewal and citizen participation.
Protests in The Hague were tame in comparison to the
frequently violent demonstrations and occasional riots which
arose in neighborhoods slated for demolition during the
construction of the Amsterdam Metro and other such projects.
These conflicts continue today, despite the creation of a
formal mechanism for participation. No one I spoke to
believed that the "project group" system of participation
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which currently operates in Amsterdam would have been con-
sidered if bitter conflict had not followed the city's
initial planning efforts.
Priemus' second major contribution, in my opinion,
is his recognition of the fact that the participation process
can go sour, necessitating the reintroduction of conflict
strategies. We saw several cases of this in The Hague. In
Renbaankwartier, the participation process ended on schedule,
but without complete agreement. Instead of proceeding to
a higher level of bargaining, the confrontation process was
reintroduced, almost willingly by the action group. Since
conflict is both costly and time-consuming, its return to
Renbaankwartier can hardly be applauded. However, knowledge
on the part of the government that BBR could swiftly reintro-
duce open conflict probably contributed to the city's
willingness to compromise on issues in the participation
process. A municipality which recognizes that conflict can
easily be resurrected is more likely to make the concessions
necessary to move a process along.
If a group is divided, or tired of protest, or
financially unable to mount more confrontation, government
will have little incentive to bargain in good faith -- a
process which requires concessions from both sides.
The recent decentralization of community development
funding will probably have a great effect on the degree to
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which action groups are free to reintroduce conflict.
(See pp. 41-43 for a discussion of this decentralization
program.) By giving individual municipalities full control
over the appropriation of subsidies for neighborhood groups,
cities and towns can now use the power of the purse to
punish groups which "get out of line", and reward groups
which are well-behaved.
3) Presence of a Neighborhood Leadership. In all the
neighborhoods of The Hague which I studied, an effective
leadership was present for purposes of organization and,
eventually, participation. Since the integration of
average residents into the participatory process is difficult
and time-consuming, an existing leadership is vital to get a
new participatory process off the ground.
The leadership formulates citizen opinion into
rational positions which can be negotiated with city workers
and politicians. The leaders facilitate integration of
other citizens into the process (although there is evidence
in Schipperskwartier that the leaders prefer to handle
things themselves). Perhaps most importantly, an effective
leadership makes the threat of conflict credible to the
municipal authorities.
Community leaders shape participatory procedures in
innumerable ways, both in formal discussions with municipal
officials, and in the way they handle the day-to-day operation
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of their organizations. Their opinions and actions are
critical in determining how a participatory effort will fare
when judged according to our two final criteria: democrati-
zation and community-wide learning. The leaders of each of
the four major organizations I studied have proven that
their concern for democracy and learning (or their lack of
concern) will be translated into group policy (and thereby,
into the process of participation).
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CHAPTER V
LEARNING FROM THE EXPERIENCES IN THE HAGUE
This chapter will briefly explore what activists and
government officials (particularly in the' United States)
can learn from the experiences recounted in this report.
Before proceeding to the lessons themselves, however, I
wish to propose a model of effective citizen participation.
Modeling Effective Citizen Participation
The most important characteristic of my model is that
it is not a model at all, in the conventional sense of the
term. We commonly conceive of a model as a complex scheme
of interdependent variables which, when applied to a given
situation, enables us to predict the future (or exnlain
the past). My model boasts no such pretensions. Rather
I hope that it will provide a rough guide to the influences
which are important (or unimportant) in determining whether
of not a participatory process is "effective" according
to the five criteria we have been discussing throughout
this paper.
The fundamental premise of my "guide" to effective
citizen participation is simply this:
The effectiveness of participatory processes is deter-
mined primarily by three conditions antecedent to the
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establishment of the process, and secondarily by the par-
ticipatory techniques employed in the process itself.
The three antecedent conditions have been discussed at
length in the previous chapter; to recapitulate, they are:
a) the attitudes of city workers and citizen participants
toward each other; b) the level and form of conflict pre-
ceding the participation (and chances for the re-emergence
of conflict during or after the participation process); and
c) the presence, strength, and opinions of an indigenous
neighborhood leadership.
Since I believe the importance of these conditions has
been thoroughly discussed in the previous chapter, I will
not repeat my claims here. I will, however, note that
antecedents are the predominant influences on participatory
effectiveness for two distinct reasons. Firstly, they tend
to impart their effect before the process begins, or at
the very beginning, whereas techniques come into play only
at some point during (and perhaps very far into) the pro-
cess. The earlier the influence is applied, the greater
its impact will be on the end result, because the factor
has more time to manifest itself.
Secondly, antecendent conditions are simply more power-
ful in their own right than most techniques. The attitudes
of city officials, for example, can substantively influence
the entire process, and all of its constituent parts,
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including each technique used. A single technique,
however, is no more than a part of a larger process; it
can have influence, but rarely can its influence be so
great.
One final point is critical before we proceed to
recommendations: both antecedent conditions and partici-
patory techniques are amenable to change, although the
former are undoubtedly more difficult to influence.
Recommendations for U.S. Activists and Officials
As U.S. citizen activists and government officials
consider the creation and implementation of participatory
procedures, they will undoubtedly review the techniques
they should employ -- regardless of the fact that tech-
niques are not the primary influence on effectiveness.
Do the experience of The Hague indicate any particular
techniques (or, more generally, kinds of techniques) which
seem highly correlated with effectiveness, or (since it
is often difficult to draw correlations from only five
case studies) techniques which the participants them-
selves found useful? The answer is "yes"; although it
would not be possible to definitively describe each tech-
nique, I will present a few which I believe are particu-
larly likely to be transferable to the U.S. scene:
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1) Use written agreements between the municipality
and residents' groups to clarify a set of goals and
determine a mutually-acceptable process for attaining
those goals in a fixed space of time. The written
agreement (based on the doelstellingennota from the
Schilderswijk case) is undoubtedly difficult to achieve,
especially when parties have been bickering for a long
time. However, these problems are generally easier to
solve than the substantive issues, and a few months of
working out a procedural agreement can go a long way to
cooling tensions and building trust before the hard bar-
gaining begins on substantive renewal questions.
This period of time can also be used to allow
both sides to decide who will serve as key persons in the
participatory process, what the division of responsibility
will be within city agencies and within the neighborhood
group(s), and to locate various "third parties" who should
be represented in the process but who have not yet been
involved.
2) Citizens must have time by themselves to think,
meet, iron out their own differences, and talk freely with-
out municipal presence. Overbearing city administrations
in the U.S. frequently demand that municipal representatives
be present at all meetings; they will often send people to
neighborhood meetings uninvited. This can be extremely
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counterproductive because it reduces the level of trust
between both sides. Just as municipal officials can meet
alone in their offices, citizens should also have a chance
to take care of their own business in private, and prepare
positions for negotiating sessions without municipal inter-
ference.
The Dutch code of civil behavior places a high
priority on privacy, and each case I studied in The Hague
made allowances for the type of meetings discussed above.
3) Hold special neighborhood meetings (with the attend-
ance of municipal planners, where appropriate) to discuss
specific planning issues, provide information, and compare
the relative merits of differing opinions -- without the
need to make a decision on that day regarding any particu-
lar stand. Such meetings organized by Planwinkel in
Molenwijk were very useful in explaining key issues to
residents, expanding community-wide learning, and making
the decision and negotiating sessions more efficient.
4) Employ a host of mechanisms to cut down on red
tape and bureaucratic delays. Special trouble-shooters,
adherence to strict deadlines, intra-agency coordination
teams, and other such methods could be useful. Since
delay breeds mistrust, it must be minimized.
5) Use innovative techniques to involve children,
the elderly, and the handicapped in the process. Special
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outreach workers are probably needed in this regard; but
even more can be done, as evidenced by Planwinkel's efforts
to involve children via the schools, and to arrange meetings
at times convenient for housewives. In Schilderswijk, part
of the Oranjeplein development was targeted to the elderly,
and Payable Rents tried to get their opinions about how their
units should be organized.
6) Make certain that all interested parties to a
renewal project are represented in the process, and encour-
age democratic operating procedures within the citizen
organizations that are involved. Both of these steps strive
to ensure that the participation process takes into account
the true feeling of as many residents as possible in order
to locate a true neighborhood consensus (if that can be
achieved), and to prevent future conflict by limiting the
number of parties who will feel that the process left them
out.
7) Urban neighborhoods are large and diverse. It is
frequently useful to divide them up into small districts,
with a planning team to consider the problems and needs
of each. This will help isolate localized issues, encour-
age people to become involved even though they are only
concerned with their immediate area, and take advantage of
small working groups of people who probably know each other.
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At the same time, the interests of the entire
neighborhood should not be ignored. The neighborhood-
wide working groups organized in Schilderswijk to deal
with particular subject areas represent one way of
bridging the gap between localized, district issues
and concerns of the entire neighborhood.
Now we arrive at the more difficult issue of telling
activists and citizens what they might do to make the all-
important antecedent conditions more favorable to citizen
participation. Such steps are hard to locate, and once
located they are hard to accomplish. However, I believe
there are three particular classes of actions which U.S.
activists and officials could benefit from knowing:
1) Leadership is not pre-ordained. Group members must
choose their leaders carefully, not based merely on who
knows the most, who speaks the best, or who has the most
forceful personality. Here are some other qualities to
consider (and to examine carefully if they are not obvious
at first glance): respect for the opinions of others,
willingness to work with groups, concern for the knowledge
and understanding of those working with him, and capacity
to change his own theories and assumptions about the world
around him. At one point or another, groups usually have
the chance to decide who will be in charge, and they must
choose with care.
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2) Municipal governments should encourage neighbor-
hood self-organization. Dutch traditions of opbouwwerk,
plus recent political developments like the organizing
efforts of Max van der Berg in Groningen (see p.174) create
a social expectation in Holland that the municipal govern-
ment will help (or, at very least, will not hinder) the
efforts of neighborhoods to develop coherent residents
organizations to lobby on behalf of local interests.
This expectation does not yet exist in the United States,
where municipalities are allowed (and even expected) to
attempt to undermine neighborhood organizing in any way
possible.
Under the American system, neighborhood groups
usually organize themselves anyway, attack government,
and are repeatedly attacked by government in an attempt
to destroy or weaken them. This process makes the growth
of trust and cooperation virtually impossible.
In The Netherlands, the right of citizen groups
to organize and protect their interests is recognized.
This is essentially a manifestation of the politics of
accommodation on the local level: any group can organize
to take part in Dutch pluralism provided they abide by
the basic groundrules of civility and deference. The
result is a set of resident groups which are generally
more docile than American groups, but also more accepted
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as political entities that speak for recognized consti-
tuencies and have guaranteed rights as organizations.
Dutch municipalities (and the central government) help
these organization to grow by providing subsidies, meeting
spaces, opbouwwerkers and other staff persons, and regular
contacts with municipal personnel. Naturally, some Dutch
municipalities are more generous and cooperative than
others; Rotterdam is very helpful, while Nijmegen is
obstructive. On the whole, however, municipal officials
adhere to a policy of "self-organization" which states:
government willhelp neighborhood groups to organize them-
selves (as long as they obey the code of civil behavior),
but we reserve the right to disagree with and oppose these
neighborhood organizations in relation to specific policy
issues.
My observations in Holland indicate that the Dutch
system creates a more coherent neighborhood network
capable of defending neighborhood interests to city hall
with a minimum of conflict and distrust. A greater effort
on the part of American municipal officials to aid in the
development of neighborhood organizations (or at least not
interfere with such efforts) would probably improve the
climate in which participatory efforts can develop.
3) Neighborhood groups must leave the door to conflict
open even during a participatory process. If they do not,
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they are likely to suffer attacks from more militant
organizations in their own community. In addition,
the municipality is always more likely to grant conces-
sions to an organization which it knows is capable of
reasserting protest at any time. Without an open door
to conflict, a participatory process is likely to
stagnate when the municipality realizes that it no longer
has anything to fear from the residents.
A municipality has many weapons to use against
communities; but neighborhoods have only protest. Once
they give that weapon up, municipal officials will have
little reason to listen to them. A good participatory
process demands a balanced power relationship. Without
an open door to conflict, this balance disintegrates,
as the leaders of BOS painfully learned during the
Schilderswijk structure-planning effort.
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